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Wilkerson et al.: Attorney Advertising: Bates' Impact on Regulation

STUDENT PROJECT
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING: BATES'
IMPACT ON REGULATION
"Since the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has
become an anachronism, the historicalfoundation for the advertising restrainthas crumbled." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97
S. Ct. 2691, 2703 (1977).
Ensuring proper conduct in the practice of law is the primary
purpose of the American Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility.' This paradigm for professional conduct has
served several functions. The state bar associations look to the
ABA Code as a model for their ethical codes. Attorneys look to
the Code for individual guidance and for ensuring the proper
conduct of other attorneys. The landmark decision of Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona adds another function to the Code: assuring
the public of its ability to learn about the availability of legal
services through the regulated advertising of attorneys.
Defendants Bates and O'Steen, operating a legal clinic in
Phoenix, Arizona, placed an advertisement in the Arizona
Republic, offering "legal services at very reasonable fees."' The
ad specifically listed the rates charged for certain legal matters,
denominated routine by the defending attorneys.' Bates and
O'Steen conceded that their advertisement violated Disciplinary
Rule 2-101(B), 4 which the Supreme Court of Arizona had adopted
as Rule 29(a) .2Acting in accordance with the rules promulgated
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].
2. 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2694. For amendments to Canon 2, see Appendix D.
3. Charges were for uncontested divorces; legal separations; preparation of court
papers; instructions on how to do your own simple, uncontested divorce; uncontested
severance proceedings; adoptions; nonbusiness, noncontested bankruptcies; and name
changes. Id. at 2710.
4. ABA CODE DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-101(B) [hereinafter cited as DR 2-101(B)]. See
Appendix D.
5. 17A ARIZ. REv. STAT., Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 29(a) (1976 Supp.) provides in part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements
in the city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor
shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1978

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

by the Arizona Supreme Court, the Arizona state bar then filed
a complaint. A three member committee of the bar, on hearing,
recommended at least a six-month suspension from practice for
each attorney. The state bar's board of governors reviewed the
situation and reduced the suspension to one week. Bates and
O'Steen subsequently appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court on
antitrust and first amendment grounds. The court rejected both
grounds, but reduced the penalty from suspension to censure.'
The United States Supreme Court ultimately reversed on the first
amendment issue and upheld the Arizona court on the antitrust
issue.7 The Bates decision allows for the advertisement of routine
legal services 8 and recognizes that "false, deceptive, or misleading" advertising can be regulated?
Taking these guidelines, the American Bar Association Task
Force on Lawyer Advertising developed recommendations on how
the Bar could respond to the Court's decision. ° From these recommendations, the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility developed a pair of alternative amendments to the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility." The sum of this effort
resulted in the revised Canon 2, adopted by the ABA at its annual
meeting in Chicago on August 10, 1977.12

The adopted revision to Canon 2 of the ABA Code suggests
to state bar associations the proper and ethical conduct to be
achieved by the state bars' regulations for the advertisement of
legal services. Language throughout Bates teaches attorneys the
minimum to expect for themselves and from other attorneys in
their first amendment right to advertise. With the public's interest at stake on the other side of first amendment protection, yet
another perspective from the ABA Code has resulted: that of
extraprofessional regulation. Attorneys' advertising conduct will
Id., quoted in Bates, 97 S. Ct. at 2694 n. 5.
6. 97 S. Ct. at 2695-96.
7. Id. at 2709.
8. Id. at 2703.
9. Id. at 2708.
10. Supreme Court Holds Lawyers May Advertise, 63 A.B.A.J. 1093, 1097 (1977);
AMERICAN BAR AssOCATION [hereinafter cited as ABA]. The Task Force held an organizational meeting on July 1, 1977, chaired by S. Shepherd Tate, the president-elect of the
ABA. Additional members included Michael Franck of Lansing, Michigan; Thomas S.
Johnson of Rockford, Illinois; Kirk McAlpin of Atlanta, Georgia; John C. McNulty of
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Lewis H. Van Dusen, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
11. Id. at 1097.
12. ABA Press Release (Aug. 18, 1977); see 46 U.S.L.W. 2092, 2093 (Aug. 23, 1977).
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be subject not only to their intraprofessional standards but also
to any applicable legal standards developed by the courts and by
legislation.
The first section of this project summarizes the history of the
commerical speech doctrine and compares parts of the amendment to Canon 2 with the Bates mandate. The next division
analyzes the historical difficulties of the profession's disciplinary
systems and of advertising and suggests particular problem areas
that the use of advertising might present for intraprofessional
regulation. The third part details the development of legal and
ethical standards of conduct and surveys the functions of extraprofessional bodies, which have the responsibility of policing attorney advertising. The last division compares the state bar associations' proposals with the revised ABA Canon 2 and Bates language based on the results of a letter inquiry conducted shortly
after the Bates decision was announced.' 3
I.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND ATTORNEY ADVERTISING

If one phrase were selected from the Bates opinion to summarize that decision, it would necessarily be "reasonable regulation."' 4 The decision is the latest in a series of Supreme Court
opinions that have attempted to limn first amendment protection
of commercial advertising. For years the Court held that
"commercial speech"'' 5 was outside the realm of the first amendment and, therefore, the states were free to regulate it as they
deemed necessary. Gradually, the Court created numerous exceptions that diluted the general rule. With the Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc." decision in 1976, the Court reduced the commercial speech doctrine
to a balancing test to determine the limits of state regulation in
the commercial area. Although commercial advertising was found
to be a protected form of speech, the Court did not hold that this
form of speech was free from regulation. To the contrary, the
13. Solicitations were conducted by the South Carolina Law Review Comments
Office from August 16, 1977, and were updated through October 1977 (responses on file
in the South Carolina Law Review Comments Office).
14. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
15. This is the term used to refer to commercial advertising, which was determined
in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), to be outside the protection of the first
amendment.
16. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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Court stated that the potential of unrestrained advertising to
mislead the consumer requires strict regulation. This potential is
inevitable in the advertising of professional services in which
there is an especially great possibility of deception. The Court in
Bates delegated the task of regulating attorney advertising to the
organized bar. 7 Whether the responses of the state bar associations to Bates will prove to be adequate for the consumer and the
attorney will ultimately depend on the success or the failure of
regulatory entities in enforcing the revised professional guidelines.
A.

The Commercial Speech Doctrine

The commercial speech doctrine was first articulated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Valentine v. Chrestensen.11Justice
Roberts' short, but far-reaching opinion set the stage for thirtyfive years of confusion as to what type of commercial expression
was protected by the first amendment.19 The case held that although the government may not constitutionally proscribe the
communication of information or dissemination of opinion in the
public streets, "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising."2 Thus,
the Court determined that the first amendment provided no protection to one attempting to "pursue a gainful occupation in the
streets" and termed the matter as one "for legislative judgment." I' The Court cited no authority for the doctrine in its opin17. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
18. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). This suit arose out of a challenge to a New York City ordinance
that prohibited the distribution of handbills in the city's streets. The respondent sought
to distribute handbills to advertise the submarine he had brought to New York from
Florida and had opened to the public for a stated admission fee. On the reverse of the
handbill, the respondent had printed a message protesting the city's refusal to allow the
docking of his submarine at a public pier. The Court disregarded the protest message
because it was a mere facade to evade the prohibition of the statute.
19. See Comment, The Demise of the Commercial Speech Doctrine and the Regulation of Professional'sAdvertising: The Virginia Pharmacy Case, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
245 (1977). "From its inception, the [commercial speech] doctrine was ambiguous, difficult to apply, and engendered much controversy and comment." Id. at 245. But see
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963). "Up
to the present, the problem of differentiating between commercial and other communication has not in practice proved to be a serious one." Id. at 949 n.93.
20. 316 U.S. at 54.
21. Id. See also 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 245, note 19 supra, at 247; Note, The
Commercial Speech Doctrine: The FirstAmendment at a Discount, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv.
60, 67 (1974).
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ion, but the decision's basis appears to be the right of the public
to use the streets free from the harassment of solicitation by
merchants.
After Chrestensen, the Supreme Court continued to apply
the commercial speech doctrine in a perfunctory fashion. 2 If a
publication could be labeled a "paid 'commercial' advertisement, '2 it would be stripped of all first amendment protection
and would be subject to complete regulation or prohibition by the
state. Finally, the Court attempted to temper the harsh effect of
the doctrine in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan24 by creating an
exception for a paid advertisement that "communicated information. . . of the highest public interest and concern." In this case
the plaintiffs argued that a full-page notice placed in the New
York Times by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King was
not entitled to first amendment protection because it was in the
form of a "paid 'commercial' advertisement."2 The Court upheld
the defendant's first amendment assertions by declaring the fact
that "the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as
immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and
books are sold." Although this public interest exception avoided
the harsh results of strict adherence to the commercial speech
doctrine, it provided little guidance for future application of the
Chrestensen rule. Logically, this exception could have been expanded to such an extent that it would have diminished the general rule. For example, the political portion of the Chrestensen
advertisement could arguably have been categorized as of public
interest and, thus, within the first amendment protection created
by New York Times. 5 What was needed was a test to determine
how substantial the public interest must be in order to neutralize
the commercial speech doctrine.
The opportunity for the Court to clarify the status of the
doctrine presented itself in PittsburghPress Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations.2" This case involved an at22. See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
23. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. Id. at 266.
26. Id. at 265.
27. Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
28. Id. In Chrestensen, the reverse side of the handbill contained a political advertisement, as well as a commercial advertisement on the front. See note 18 & accompanying
text supra.
29. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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tempt by the National Organization for Women (NOW) to enforce a Pittsburgh city ordinance that prohibited the designation
in employment advertisements of male or female jobs without a
bona fide occupational qualification. In spite of first amendment
assertions by Pittsburgh Press, the Court termed the discriminatory advertisements as "classic examples of commercial
speech."" The public interest exception was found not to be applicable, since none of the advertisements expressed "a position
. . . of social policy . . . nor [did] any of them criticize the
Ordinance or the Commission's enforcement practices." 3' Rather
than base its decision squarely on the commercial speech doctrine, however, the Court added further uncertainty to the area
by stating that "[d]iscrimination in employment is not only
'32
commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity ....
Since employment discrimination was illegal under the ordinance, the city was certainly authorized to prohibit its promotion.
The illegal activity rationale enabled the Court to evade the comhad promercial speech doctrine, which many commentators
33
Press.
Pittsburgh
in
overruled
be
would
jected
B.

The Downfall of the Commercial Speech Doctrine Under a
FirstAmendment Balancing Test

The Court's equivocation in PittsburghPress was challenged
two years later in Bigelow v. Virginia.34 This case involved a paid
advertisement placed in a Virginia newspaper for a New York
abortion service. A Virginia statute prohibited the advertising of
30. Id. at 385.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 388.
In Pittsburgh Press, the Court employed the New York Times analysis and
concluded that the employment advertisement did not convey information con-

cerning public issues. In addition, the Court stated that because the advertisements also furthered illegal activity they would not be entitled to first amendment protection. .

.

. Both PittsburghPress and New York Times attempted

clarification of the commercial speech doctrine, but neither succeeded. Instead,
these two cases weakened the once firm principle and intensified the mounting
criticism of the doctrine.
34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 245, note 19 supra, at 250-51 (footnotes omitted).
33. See Comment, The Commercial Speech Doctrine: Bigelow v. Virginia, 12 URB.

L. ANN. 221 (1976). Many theorists believed that "the time was ripe for a definitive
statement and that the Court would either establish the boundaries of the doctrine or
abrogate it altogether, at the next opportunity." Id. at 227; see also Devore & Nelson,
Commercial Speech and PaidAccess to the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 745, 774 (1975).
34. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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abortion information, and Bigelow, the managing editor of the
paper, was convicted for violation of that statute. On appeal the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction and distinguished this
situation from the ordinary commercial speech issue. "The advertisement published in appellant's newspaper did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual mate35
rial of clear 'public interest.'

Although Bigelow did not decide the extent of first amendment protection for commercial advertising, the opinion suggested that commercial speech could be entitled to some degree
of first amendment protection and that the familiar balancing
test" would be the appropriate standard in determining the limits
of future protection. "Regardless of the particular label asserted
by the State-whether it calls speech 'commercial' or
'commercial advertising' or 'solicitation'-a court may not escape
the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and
weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by the
regulation. '31

The Court's reasoning presaged the resolution of many issues
to be raised in Bates. A major shortcoming of the opinion, however, was the Court's failure to clarify what would encompass the
"First Amendment interest at stake." 38 The Court avoided detailing "the type of social interests that commercial speech furthers,

' 39

which the majority had intimated should be balanced

against the state's interest in regulation." "Protected speech may
be restricted . . if the interests of the state in the regulation
outweigh the first amendment interests in the expression. 41 The

traditional method used by the Court in determining the limits
35. Id. at 822.
36. Basically, in order to apply the test it must first be determined what, if any, first
amendment interest is furthered by the speech in question. That interest must then be
weighed against the justifications asserted by the state in regulating or restricting the
speech. The end result is a judicial determination of the extent of allowable state regulation. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemokto v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 273-89 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also A. MmiJoHN, FREE SPEECH:
AND ITS RELATION To SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Emerson, note 19 supra.
37. 421 U.S. at 826.
38. Id.
39. 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 245, note 19 supra, at 253.
40. See 421 U.S. at 826. "First amendment protection, of course, is not determined
in an all-or-nothing basis." Redish, The FirstAmendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 447 (1971).
41. 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 245, note 19 supra, at 257.
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of such allowable restriction has been a balancing test.4" In order
to apply the balancing test, the competing interests at stake must
be clearly delineated. These factors were not identified in Bigelow
and remained undefined until 1976 when the Supreme Court decided Virginia State Board of Pharmacyv. VirginiaCitizens Consumer Council.43
Holding that commercial speech is entitled to some degree
of first amendment protection," the Court in VirginiaPharmacy
also clarified the factors to be weighed in considering a regulation
of commercial speech. A group of consumers brought the suit,
claiming that their first amendment rights had been abridged by
the state's prohibition of price advertising by pharmacists. The
plaintiffs alleged they had been denied access to the free flow of
commercial information.45 The majority found that the interest of
the consumer" in receiving information of a commercial nature
is the proper focus in the first amendment balancing process.47
The structure of the test had been distinctly outlined by the
adversaries in Virginia Pharmacy. The need for consumers with
42. For an exhaustive study of the balancing test in first amendment analysis, see
MEIKLJOHN, note 36 supra; see also Emerson, note 19 supra; Redish, note 40 supra, at
429.
43. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
44. Id. at 761.
45. Id. at 753-54. The right of access doctrine was not a novel one to the Supreme
Court. See generally NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession'sDuty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 118586 (1972); see also United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971);
UMW, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
46. Justice Rehnquist, however, disagreed with the majority's analysis, "I do not find
the question of the appellees' standing to urge the claim which the Court decides quite as
easy as the Court does." 425 U.S. at 781-82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is interesting
to note, however, that the Court did not overrule Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F.
Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969), which had previously upheld the same regulation questioned
in Virginia Pharmacy against an attack by pharmacists. Instead, the Court adopted the
lower court's distinction regarding the plaintiffs in Patterson Drug: "ITiheirs was a
prima facie commercial approach." 425 U.S. at 755 (quoting Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Va. 1974)). See also
Comment, Advertising of Professional Fees:Does the Consumer Have a Right to Know?,
21 S.D.L. REv. 310 (1976).
47. 425 U.S. at 756-57. "Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker ...
[T]he protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients
both. . . . If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by these appellees." Id. See Comment, ConstitutionalLaw:
The Commercial Speech Doctrine and the Consumer'sRight to Receive, 16 WASHBURN L.J.
197 (1976); 81 YALE L.J. 1181, note 45 supra, at 1185-91; 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv., note 19
supra, at 256-57.
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low or fixed incomes to receive the best price possible on prescription drugs, society's interest in the free flow of commercial information affecting the public interest, and the goal of efficiently
allocating the nation's resources were some of the justifications
advanced in favor of the consumer's right to receive such information. The state countered with arguments such as the adverse
effect on professionalism, the potential of price advertising to
mislead, and the fear that price shopping by patients would result
in the loss of stable pharmacist-patient relationships. Upon consideration of all the competing interests, the Court concluded
that "the State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance." 4 8 Cast
in this light, the consumer's interest should clearly prevail: "It is
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available,
that the First Amendment makes for us."4 However, as Justice
Stewart pointed out in his concurring opinion, "there are important differences between commercial price and product advertising, on the one hand, and ideological communication on the
other."5 0 With ideological communication, "disregard of the
'truth' may be employed to give force to the underlying idea
expressed by the speaker." 51 Justice Stewart reasoned that
"'[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea,' and that the only way that ideas can be suppressed is
through 'the competition of other ideas.' ",2 There is no room to
stray from the truth in commercial advertising; speech in this
area must be subject to reasonable controls in order to assure that
the consuming public will not be deceived by false or misleading
statements. Justice Stewart employed the reasoning of the majority opinion to show that regulation does not offend traditional
notions of first amendment protection:
The First Amendment protects the advertisement because of
the "information of potential interest and value" conveyed,
...rather than because of any direct contribution to the interchange of ideas .... Since the factual claims contained in commercial price or product advertisements relate to tangible goods
48. 425 U.S. at 769.
49. Id. at 770. See also 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv.245, note 19 supra, at 257.
50. 425 U.S. at 779 (Stewart, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 780.
52. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
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or services, they may be tested empirically and corrected to
reflect the truth without in any manner jeopardizing the free
dissemination of thought. Indeed, the elimination of false and
deceptive claims serves to promote the one facet of commercial
price and product advertising that warrants First Amendment
protection-its contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable
information relevant to public and private decisionmaking.
Thus, the Court concluded in Virginia Pharmacy that the
consumer's right to hear information of a commercial nature was
sufficiently significant to override the state's interest in proscribing advertising by pharmacists. However, the majority had been
cautious not to rule that commercial speech "can never be regulated in any way." 54 Regulation of time, place, and manner, deceptive advertising practices, and restrictions against advertising
illegal products were some of the problem areas mentioned by the
Court,5 but other areas in which regulation might be necessary
were not foreclosed. 6 Thus, the Court determined that speech in
the commercial area, although not "wholly outside the protection
of" the first amendment,5" was nevertheless subject to stricter
controls than other protected forms of speech due to the potential
of commercial advertising to mislead the consumer.
C. Lawyer Advertising in the Balance
Writing for the majority in Bates, Justice Blackmun termed
the decision as one flowing "a fortiori" from the decision in
Virginia Pharmacy." The reasoning in the two cases was almost
identical," and issues previously raised were refined further in
Bates. The Court began its consideration of the first amendment
issues with a review of the analysis developed in Virginia
Pharmacy and then embarked on a lengthy discussion of the
competing interests involved in the balancing process. Receiving
information about the prices charged for legal services was found
to be as substantial an interest as the right to learn about prescription prices. On the other side of the scale, however, the Court
53.
54,
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

425 U.S. at 780-81 (citations omitted).
Id. at 770.
Id. at 771-72.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 761.
97 S. Ct. 2691, 2700.
Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in both cases.
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emphasized that the state's interest might be much stronger in
regulating the advertising of professional services, than in regulating price advertising of prepackaged drugs." The fear that
consumers of legal services will choose an attorney solely on the
basis of his fees, rather than on the more important factors of skill
and experience, was a major argument advocated by the bar. It
termed attorney advertising as "inherently misleading""1 and
argued that legal services could not be advertised in a way to
prevent the public from being deceived. Noting the bar's concern,
the majority recognized that "because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be
overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be
found quite inappropriate in legal advertising."6
Despite these and other convincing justifications for the
proscription of advertising of legal services, the fiv'e-man majority still was persuaded that "the flow of such information may
not be restrained. 6 3 But "many of the problems in defining the
boundary between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising remain to be resolved," 4 and the Court emphasized "that the bar
will have a special role to play in assuring that advertising by
attorneys flows both freely and cleanly." 5 In fact, the need for
reasonable regulation is relatively greater when the subject of the
advertisement is professional services, as opposed to prepackaged drugs, because of the inherently misleading nature of
such advertising. 6 Since the dangers to the consumer are greater
60. We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other
professions, the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions,
may require consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for
example, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional
services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced
possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds
of advertising.
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (emphasis in original).
Mr. Justice Powell, dissenting in Bates, further refined this difference, based on two
fundamental distinctions: "the vastly increased potential for deception and the enhanced
difficulty of effective regulation in the public interest." 97 S. Ct. at 2713 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
61. 97 S. Ct. at 2703.
62. Id. at 2709.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.

66. Advertising of legal services is inherently misleading due to general public ignorance in legal matters and the difficulties of defining "routine legal services." Id.
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in the form of attorney advertising than in other forms, the allowable level of regulation must be proportionately higher. The need
for reasonable regulation is therefore apparent as an essential
factor in the first amendment calculus. Effective controls tend to
diminish the dangers inherent in advertising practices and to act
as a counterweight in the balance. Although the consumer's interest in the free flow of information may be substantial enough to
override a total proscription of advertising, the question of how
much regulation is reasonable arises in every case. The resolution
of that problem necessarily depends on the outcome of the initial
balancing of the competing interests at stake. In order to be reasonable, a regulation must be sufficiently restrictive to protect
the consumer from being misled by deceptive advertising and yet
allow for the free flow of important commercial information. 7
After it has been established that the state has an important
interest in regulating advertising, the next logical step in the
analysis is to determine if any method of enforcement can be
devised to meet the goal of effectively protecting the consumer.
Unless it is effective, no regulation can sufficiently carry its
weight in the first amendment balance, no matter how restrictive
it may seem on its face. The majority in Bates placed great reliance on the bar's ability to police its members adequately, as well
as its capacity to educate the public." On the other hand, Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Powell, in separate dissenting opinions, did not express confidence in the "presently deficient machinery of the bar and courts.""9 In fact, Chief Justice Burger's
appraisal of the bar's inability to handle the task was primary to
his reasoning that the scales should tip the other way and disallow lawyer advertising. He characterized the majority opinion as
"a 'great leap' into an unexplored, sensitive regulatory area where
the legal profession and the courts have not yet learned to crawl,
let alone stand up or walk."7 Justice Powell continued the attack
on the majority, declaring that "[tihe Court's almost casual
67. This dual mandate was expressed by the Court in terms of "insuring that the
stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely." 425 U.S. at 772. See also
97 S.Ct. at 2709.
68. See 97 S.Ct. at 2704. "If the naivete of the public will cause advertising by
attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar's role to assure that the populace is sufficiently informed as to enable it to place advertising in its proper perspective." Id.
69. Id. at 2711 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See Section II
infra.
70. Id.
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assumption that its authorization of price advertising can be policed effectively by the Bar reflects a striking underappreciation
71
of the nature and magnitude of the disciplinary problem."
It is clear from these conflicting views expressed in Bates
that the factor of effectiveness will be primary in future judicial
scrutiny of any regulatory measures concerning advertising propounded by the bar. No regulation will be allowed if it prevents
the dissemination of useful consumer information, and unless it
accomplishes the task of protecting the unwary consumer of legal
services from being deceived. Whether any regulation meets this
second requirement will necessarily depend on how effective the
rule proves to be in practice. Thus, when scrutinizing a regulation
in the future, once it has been determined not to restrict unconstitutionally the flow of truthful information, a court must see
whether the rule is equipped with a workable mechanism for
effective enforcement of its regulatory scheme.
D.

The ABA Responds: Revisions in Canon 2

In an effort to meet the challenge proposed by the Bates
Court, the ABA House of Delegates approved, on August 10, 1977,
at its annual meeting in Chicago, major changes in Canon 2 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.72 Although the ABA Code
is merely a model, it will undoubtedly be used by many state bars
in formulating their disciplinary rules and will, therefore, be a
good indicator of the approach that will be taken by most states
in discharging their special role of regulation. 3 Within the framework of the Bates mandate, the revised guidelines must be tested
in light of the consumer's first amendment right to receive information about legal services.
The Court specifically held that "[t]he State may [not]
prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful
advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine
legal services." 74 The ABA regulations satisfy this minimum requirement and further permit the lawyer to publicize "[flixed
fees for specific legal services, the description of which would not
71. Id. at 2715 (Powell, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).

72. See ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AMENDMENTS,

46 U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug.

23, 1977), reprinted in Appendix D.
73. See Section IV infra.
74. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
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be misunderstood or be deceptive. . .. ,,T5
Furthermore, the rules
list twenty-five areas of allowable disclosure "[i]n order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential
consumers of legal services .

.

. ."I' Thus, the regulations seem

to satisfy the first amendment requirements of Bates, as well as
to provide a mechanism for expansion of the areas of allowable
disclosure should the need arise.77
The second prong of the test, whether the guidelines provide
an effective mechanism for protecting the consumer, must also be
satisfied. The dissenting justices in Bates feared that the regulatory task "could prove to be a wholly intractable problem,""
"where not even the wisest of experts-if such experts exist-can
move with sure steps."79 The ABA's response to this challenge
seems to provide a workable framework for regulating advertising
by lawyers. The amendments describe specific guidelines for lawyers to use in planning their advertising campaigus." Added consumer protection is provided by requiring a disclaimer "that the
quoted fee will be available only to clients whose matters fall into
the services described .

.

. ."I' Any requested expansions of the

allowable disclosures in DR 2-101(B) must be -reviewed by the
state agency charged with the task of enforcing the rules. It shall
determine "whether the proposal

. . .

accords with standards of

accuracy, reliability and truthfulness, and would facilitate the
process of" informing potential clients.2 In the abstract, therefore, the regulations promulgated by the ABA provide for the free
and clean flow of attorney advertising.
Thus, the rules apparently define a workable procedure for
regulating lawyer advertising. The test, however, will come in the
actual day-to-day enforcement of the regulations by the state
and local bars. The amendments also provide a practicable
structure for accomplishing the Bates mandate of protecting the
consumer. The question that remains is whether the present
75. DR 2-101(B)(25). See Appendix D.
76. DR 2-101(B). See Appendix D.
77. There isalso a provision for expanding the area of allowable disclosure if it is
determined that the first amendment interests of the consumer demand more information.
See DR 2-101(C). See Appendix D.
78. 97 S. Ct. at 2716 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
79. Id. at 2711 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
80. DR 2-101(B). See Appendix D.
81. DR 2-101(B)(25). See Appendix D.
82. DR 2-101(C). See Appendix D.
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machinery of the bar can effectively coordinate an enforcement
program that will be fair to both lawyers and consumers. The
intraprofessional systems of the bar must succeed in regulating
attorney advertising in order to quell the fears espoused by
Chief Justice Burger and the other dissenters in Bates.
II.

ATTORNEY SELF-REGULATION OF ADVERTISING

The developments of attorney self-regulation in the United
States and of the prohibition against lawyer advertising provide
enlightenment on the question of whether intraprofessional regulation of advertising will be sufficient or whether extraprofessional regulatory bodies are likely to intercede.
A.

The Canons of ProfessionalEthics: Canon 27

The first code of professional ethics in the United States was
developed in 1887 in the state of Alabama. 3 This bar association's
action touched off a flurry of similar activity in the rest of the
states, culminating with the adoption of the thirty-two Canons of
Professional Ethics by the American Bar Association in 1908.84
The stimulus of the sudden demand for a code of ethics seemed
to stem from a growing commercialism, which had been detrimental to the profession's image. 8
Canon 27, the original canon proscribing advertising, stated
that "[t]he most worthy and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers,
is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be
the outcome of character and conduct ... ."I The language of
the canon was revised completely in 1937 to allow advertising in
an approved law list and was amended in later years, enlarging
the categories of information that could be included in the lists."7
Other canons were subsequently added to define more clearly the
83. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23-24 (1953).
84. Id. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS [hereinafter cited as ABA CANONS].
85. DRINKER, note 83 supra, at 25.
86. ABA CANONS No. 27 (1908), reprinted in DRINKER, note 83 supra, at 316-17 n.6
[hereinafter cited as CANON 27].
87. Francis & Johnson, The Emperor's Old Clothes: Piercingthe Bar's Ethical Veil,
13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 221, 227 (1977) (citing DRINKER, note 83 supra, at 316-17). CANON 27
was revised in 1940, and again in 1942, 1943, 1951, and 1963. The 1951 amendment
recognized patent and trademark law, as well as admiralty, as specialty areas that could
be advertised on letterheads and in law lists. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1978

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

bounds of Canon 27.s Before revision in 1940, the language of the
canon stated that "[iindirect advertisements for professional
employment

. . .

offend the traditions and lower the tone of our

profession and are reprehensible."89
B.

The Code of Professional Responsibility: Canon 2 and the
Bates Decision

When the ABA Canons were replaced by the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1969, some of the advertising restrictions from Canon 27 appeared in Disciplinary Rule 2-101(A)
of the new Code." In February 1976, the ABA modified Disciplinary Rule 2-102(A)(6) to allow a lawyer to publish in the yellow
pages of the telephone directory his field of concentration, if any,
and, if state law allowed, his legal specialty.' For the first time,
an attorney was permitted to include any fees charged for initial
consultation, the availability upon request of a written schedule
of fees, estimates of fees charged for a specific purpose, and
whether credit arrangements were available.2
The monumental breakthrough came in Bates. The Arizona
Bar argued that advertising would "bring about commerciali88. See Francis & Johnson, note 87 supra, at 221, 226-27.
89. CANON 27 (1951), reprinted in DRINKER, note 83 supra, at 316-18. Indirect advertising was defined in CANON 27 as "furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments . . .in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation ... " DRINKER, note 83 supra, at 317-18.
90. DR 2-101(A) (1970):
A lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be prepared, use, or participate in the use
of, any form of public communication that contains professionally self-laudatory
statements calculated to attract lay clients; as used herein, "public communication" includes, but is not limited to, communication by means of television,
radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, or book.
91. DR 2-102(B)(6) (1976); see also Smith, Making the Availability of Legal Services
Better Known, 62 A.B.A.J. 855 (1976); Code Amendments Broaden Information Lawyers
May Provide in Law Lists, Directories,and Yellow Pages, 62 A.B.A.J. 309 (1976); Legal
Profession is Considering Code Amendments to Permit Restricted Advertising by
Lawyers, 62 A.B.A.J. 53 (1976). Other sources called for the extension of advertising
beyond the yellow pages, so that attorneys could become more responsive to public needs.
Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of Canon 2 of
the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 4 HoPsTRA L. REv. 183, 197 (1976); Hobbs, Lawyer
Advertising: A Good Beginning but Not Enough, 62 A.B.A.J. 735 (1976). Before Bates
confronted the Supreme Court, only Pennsylvania and Michigan had adopted the "yellow
page" amendment. See Moskowitz, The GreatAd Venture-The Legal MarketplaceAfter
Bates and O'Steen, 7 JURIs DOCTOR 15 (Sept. 1977).
92. DR 2-102(A)(6) (1976).
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zation, undermine the lawyer's sense of dignity and self-worth
and tarnish the image of the profession."9 3 The Supreme Court
replied by citing Ethical Consideration 2-19 of the ABA Code,
which calls for the mutual agreement between the attorney and
client on the basis of the fee to be charged. 4 For the majority,
Justice Blackmun pointed out that the attorney-client relationship was already a commercial one. Engineers and bankers advertise, and their professional dignity has not been undermined."
It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of
advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at another, to assert that its members
will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort. We suspect
that, with advertising, most lawyers will behave as they always
have: they will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and honor of their profession and of the legal system. 7
Justice Blackmun challenged the traditional belief that advertising would have the undesirable effect of stirring up litigation and
cited the results of a survey conducted by the American Bar
Foundation, showing that "the middle 70%" of the American
population is neither being reached nor served by the legal profession. 8 Another survey, referred to in the Court's decision, indicated that "35.8% of the adult population has never visited an
attorney and another 27.9% has visited an attorney only once." 9
The Court approved of any rule permitting restrained advertising
as commensurate with the bar's obligation, specified in Ethical
Consideration 2-1 to "facilitate the process of intelligent selection
93. 97 S. Ct. at 2701.
94. ABA CODE ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 2-19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as EC 2-19],
cited in Bates, 97 S. Ct. at 2701.
95. 97 S. Ct. at 2701.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2707.
98. 97 S. Ct. at 2705 (quoting American Bar Association, Revised Handbook Prepaid
Legal Services: Papers and Documents Assembled by the Special Committee on Prepaid
Legal Services 2 (1972)).
99. 97 S. Ct. at 2705 n.33 (citing survey conducted by ABA Special Committee to
Survey Legal Needs in collaboration with the American Bar Foundation, reprintedin 3
Alternatives: Legal Services & the Public 15 (1976)). See also B. Curran & F. Spalding,
The Legal Needs of the Public 96 (1974), cited in 97 S. Ct. at 2705 n.33 for an earlier report
concerning the preliminary release of some of the results of the survey mentioned by the
Bates Court.
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of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available."' 00
In response to the Bates decision, the ABA adopted a revised
Canon 2 that authorizes both print and radio advertisements, but
does not permit television advertising. The immediate reaction to
the new Canon 2 was explosive. Consumer groups and the Department of Justice objected to both the amendment to the canon and
to a second approach, not adopted, but submitted to the states
for consideration as an alternative plan. ' The adopted plan was
more objectionable to both groups than was the proposed alternate.' " Former Texas State Bar President Leroy Jeffers asserted
that the amendment was "'permissive, and not prohibitive,' and
goes 'far beyond what the Supreme Court requires'" in attorney
advertisements.' °3 Several delegates to the ABA meeting that
adopted the new canon expressed reservations about potential
first amendment problems, since the adopted guidelines attempt
04
to restrict ad content.
There has been much speculation about the course of professional self-regulation in advertising and about the state bar associations' resources to ensure the free flow of attorney advertising.
In June 1970 the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, popularly known as the Clark Committee,
reported "'the existence of a scandalous situation.' ",105 The committee discovered that lawyers displayed apathetic-to-hostile attitudes towards disciplinary enforcement. 8 Thirty-six specific
100. 97 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing EC 2-1).

101. ABA Press Release, Aug. 19, 1977 (on file in South Carolina Law Review Comments Office). The plan adopted was termed "Proposal A" and was considered regulatory,

while the alternative plan, "Proposal B," was considered directive. 46 U.S.L.W. 1, 2 (Aug.
23, 1977).
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Leroy Jeffers, former president of Texas State Bar).
104. Id. EC 2-9 mentions, among other things, that representations concerning the
quality of service and inclusion of information relevant to selecting a lawyer could be
deceptive because of the lack of sophistication on the part of many members of the public
concerning legal services. See generally 97 S. Ct. at 2705 n.33; Note, Advertising, Solicitation, and the Profession'sDuty to Make Legal CounselAvailable, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1191
(1972).
105. Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It SelfRegulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 194 n.6 (1974) (quoting ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLI-

(June 1970) [Clark Committee Report]).
106, Id. "'Disciplinary action is practically nonexistent in many jurisdictions; practices and procedures are antiquated; many disciplinary agencies have little power to take
effective steps against malefactors.' "Id.

NARY ENFORCEMENT 1
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problems were found to exist within the usual system for lawyer
discipline, ranging from inadequate financing of disciplinary
agencies for investigations and the conduct of proceedings to reluctance on the part of lawyers and judges to report instances of
professional misconduct." 7 The committee recommended reformation of the disciplinary structures of the states to provide
"more centralization, greater power and swifter action."'' s
In response to the Clark Committee Report, the ABA established a Standing Committee on Professional Discipline and a
National Center for Professional Discipline to "promote effective
disciplinary enforcement in the United States."'' 9 The committee
and the center provide consulting services and training programs
for individual lawyers and disciplinary agencies and also furnish
informational materials on lawyer discipline." ' As a result, many
state disciplinary jurisdictions have adopted rules similar to
those recommended by the Clark Committee."' In addition, the
Watergate chain of events appears to have spurred the appointment of laypersons to the state disciplinary committees."' After
the establishment of the standing committee and the center,
'
disciplinary action increased 85% between 1973 and 1975."1
Although the Clark Committee Report has apparently stimulated many procedural reforms at the state level, it has been
questioned whether the reforms will actually affect the profession's hesitancy to inform on its own, and whether it will be more
likely that an ethical infraction once reported will result in disciplinary action against the malefactor. A summary of disciplinary
statistics furnished by the Standing Committee on Professional
107. Rochester, N.Y. Record, May 2, 1977, at 2A. See generally Marks & Cathcart,
note 105 supra.

108. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, note 105 supra, at 3. For 14 of
the significant recommendations in the Clark Committee Report, see Appendix A-C
(summary of disciplinary statistics furnished by the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, through the Center for Professional Discipline, to the Administrative

Office of the Chief Justice for use in his Year-End Report to the United States Supreme
Court), cited in Rochester, N.Y. Record, note 107 supra, at 8A.

109. Rochester, N.Y. Record, note 107 supra, at 2A.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 8A. See Appendix C, Table 3.
112. Rochester, N.Y. Record, note 107 supra, at 8A.See Appendix C, Table 4. Twelve
states have added nonlawyer representation to their disciplinary boards as of May 2, 1977.

Id.
113. Rochester, N.Y. Record, note 107 supra, at 8A. See Appendix A, Table 1.
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Discipline indicates that disciplinary activity has increased;",
however, the figures do not indicate whether there has been a
percentage increase in the number of lawyer complaints about
fellow lawyers. Although one might argue that an increase in
disciplinary measures from whatever source is commendable,
only the most obvious violations tend to be reported by the public. Thus, it is not certain whether the ability of lawyers to originate their own disciplinary measures has, in fact, improved since
the Clark Committee Report. Out of 33,007 complaints filed
against lawyers in state level disciplinary agencies in 1975, only
693 lawyers were publicly disciplined." 5 This figure amounted to
an average of 47.6 complaints per instance of discipline imposed." 6
While the states have made significant strides in their disciplinary procedures since the Clark Committee Report, the established disciplinary mechanisms may be insufficient to protect
attorney advertising in everyday practice. Justice Powell, dissenting in Bates, addressed this issue; "[i]n view of the sheer
size of the profession, the existence of a multiplicity of jurisdictions, and the problem inherent in the maintenance of ethical
standards even of a profession with established traditions, the
problem of disciplinary enforcement in this country has proven
to be extremely difficult.""
Future violations of advertising regulations will be distinctly
visible in the legal community. If lawyers attempt to advertise
beyond the limits of the Bates mandate and the new Disciplinary
Rules, the number of complaints to the local grievance committees would probably increase. Many jurisdictions have improved
their procedures for handling complaints since 1970,118 yet the
increased number of complaints could well bemire the existing
systems to the point of causing borderline ethical violations to be
ignored. Since the ratio of 47.6 complaints to one instance of
public discipline could increase, the overall efficiency of the disciplinary structure could be impaired. As a result, fewer attorneys
could be disciplined for any ethical violation.
114. See Appendix B, Table 2.
115. Id.
116. Id. Neither the number of groundless complaints nor private reprimands is reflected in these figures.
117. 97 S. Ct. at 2715 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
118. Rochester, N.Y. Record, note 107 supra, at 2A.
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Further, antitrust litigation has increased the potential for
regulation of the legal profession. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar," 9 a suit brought by an attorney, the Court suggested that the
legal profession was not unconditionally exempt from the Sherman Act. 2 ' Studies conducted by Ralph Nader have indicated
that lawyer self-regulation has served the public poorly and that
the organized bar has been labeled as primarily interested in
preserving its "own profitable domain."'' The experience of the
patent bar provides some insight; advertising by patent lawyers
was allowed until 1952 under the supervision of the Patent Office. "'2 Apparently, a mere two to four percent of the total number
of patent attorneys had participated in the advertising.'23 Unfortunately, however, the Patent Office was unable to control abuses
of the activity and totally banned advertising in 1959.124
As public concern swells with evidence in the future of inadequacies in the systems established for attorney self-regulation,
the intraprofessional assurances of the free and clean flow of advertising might some day be predominantly assisted by extraprofessional regulatory bodies.
Im.

CONSIDERATION OF OUTSIDE FORCES INFLUENCING SELFREGULATION BY THE PROFESSION

In the wake of the Bates decision, the bar must reformulate
Canon 2 to provide for effective regulation of public advertising
by the profession. But at the outset of this revision, the bar is
faced with two opposing trends that dictate opposite approaches
to be taken in the formulation of rules governing lawyer advertising. The first of these is the trend to subject the bar to increasingly greater outside regulation to break down the exclusive domain of self-regulation. This has come in the form of court decisions, which have subjected the procedures and ethical canons of
the bar to closer constitutional scrutiny, and from attacks on the
bar under the antitrust laws. To confirm the natural development
of this trend, the organized bar should attempt to exercise very
119.
120.
121.
Inc.).
122.
123.
124.

421 U.S. 773 (1975). See Section IIIinfra.
Id. at 787-88. See also Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 1 (citing Ralph Nader group, Public Citizen,
Hobbs, note 91 supra, at 737.
Id.
Id.
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loose controls over the individual attorney in the regulation of
legal advertising.
But another factor must be considered, which dictates an
opposite approach to the revision of Canon 2, and that is the
influence of the Federal Trade Commission. It is ironic that the
FTC, itself an outside regulatory agency, should represent an
influence calling for tight controls over individual attorneys in
reformulating the rules for self-regulation of the profession. But
with Bates, the legal profession has entered the world of public
advertising. This area of commerce has been the subject of federal
regulation for many years, independent of any consideration of
attorney self-regulation.'25 This is not a case of an outside regulatory force trying to penetrate the walls of professional selfregulation. The profession has instead been thrust outward into
an area where the boundaries, standards, and policies have already been defined and developed by a federal regulatory agency.
The law in this area has developed in its own direction, and the
legal profession must take that law as it finds it and adapt itself
accordingly. To conform to the law of advertising, as it has developed under the FTC, the organized bar should attempt to exercise
very tight controls over the individual attorney in the regulation
of legal advertising.
A real dichotomy is present in the approaches the bar must
consider in reformulating Canon 2. The purpose of part Ill is to
outline and define further the elements of these diametrically
opposed forces that must influence the bar in formulating rules
for the regulation of professional advertising.
A.

ConstitutionalIssues and Antitrust Laws: Forces Calling
for a Non-Restrictive Approach to Lawyer Advertising

There was a time when the federal courts left the regulation
of the legal profession to the state courts and the bar associations
with very little interference. This deference to state courts and
bar associations recognized a presumption in favor of the interests
of the states in regulating the legal profession over the consideration of the individual rights of the regulated lawyer. This resulted
in a different standard being applied to evaluate the constitutional rights of lawyers as compared to those of other citizens. An
125. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1970) was enacted in
1914.
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example of this dual standard was the 1945 case In re Summers"6
in which the Supreme Court affirmed an Illinois decision denying
admission to the state bar on grounds that the applicant's religious beliefs were inconsistent with the Illinois State Constitution. Summers was a pacifist, and the state constitution included
a provision requiring service in the state militia if the state were
threatened by invasion. Since admission to the bar included an
oath to support the state constitution, which the bar believed
Summers could not take in good conscience, Summers was denied
admission to the Illinois bar, despite the religious freedom guarantees of the first amendment. Those guarantees were recognized
in the Selective Service and Training Act 27 by making allowances
for conscientious objectors during wartime,2 8 but the Illinois
State Constitution had no such provisions. In effect, Summers
had the right to religious freedom in his role as citizen/U.S. soldier but not in his role as citizen/Illinois lawyer.
Over the past twenty years, however, this inequality of standards has been adjusted through a series of Supreme Court decisions. In 1957, the Court began to scrutinize possible violations
of the individual rights of lawyers more closely. This closer scrutiny resulted in major changes in both the procedures and policies
by which the profession regulated itself. It is important to note
that these changes were brought about as a result of Supreme
Court rulings, rather than by internal decisions regarding provisions for self-regulation.
The policies and procedures relating to admission to the bar
were the first areas of regulation to receive closer constitutional
scrutiny by the Court. The 1957 companion cases of Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners 9 and Konigsberg v. State Bar of
13
California
1 mark the beginning of a more probing analysis of the
state interest involved in relation to the regulation being imposed. Both cases involved denial of admission to the practice of
law based on implications of Communist Party connections. The
Court stated that although the states had a right to require high
standards of qualification for admission to the bar, there must be
126. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
127. Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, cb. 720, 54 Stat.
885 (1940).
128. Id.
129. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
130. 353 U.S. 252 (1957) [hereinafter Konigsberg I].
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a rational connection between these qualifications and the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. A qualification of good
moral character is a legitimate standard, but there was no evidence that these rejected applicants had failed to meet that standard.' 3' That the right to practice law was entitled to due process
protection was established in 1867.32 But in Schware and
KonigsbergI, the Court went beyond the simple requirements of
notice and hearing in examining the regulation of the profession
and due process rights. The Court looked inside the procedure
itself to examine whether fundamental fairness had been preserved in determining whether or not the applicant met the standards set by the state regulation.
Although these two cases marked the beginning of the closer
scrutiny approach, they did not establish a pattern. In considering constitutional challenges to bar practices other than those
based on first amendment grounds, and even first amendment
challenges prior to 1963, the Court was reluctant to go beyond the
surface in testing the validity of state interests involved in regulation of the profession. For instance, Konigsberg was ultimately
denied admittance to the California bar in 1961. In Konigsberg
I, 133 the Supreme Court upheld his rejection on the basis that his
refusal to answer questions regarding possible Communist sympathies was a valid ground for rejecting his application. The
identical state interest was involved as that in KonigsbergI: the
assurance that only persons of good moral character be admitted
to the bar. But in this case, the Court held that Konigsberg's
refusal to answer questions constituted an obstruction of the proceedings of the investigating committee, which were necessary to
protect that valid state interest. This same obstruction-ofnecessary-proceedings argument was used to determine the identical issue in the companion case In re Anastalpo,134 despite ample
evidence that not only was Anastalpo not a Communist sympa131. Justice Black, writing for the majority in both cases, made the point in
Konigsberg I that good moral character does not mean that the applicant must have
orthodox political views (353 U.S. at 263-64) and in Schware, that conduct twenty years
earlier does not necessarily cast doubt on the applicant's present moral character (353
U.S. at 242-43).
132. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 366 (1867). The Court held that an attorney could
only be removed from the profession "for misconduct ascertained and declared by the
judgment of the Court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded." Id. at 367.
133. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
134. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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thizer, but his refusal to answer questions resulted from a philosophical disagreement between Anastalpo and certain members
of the committee.'35 In both KonigsbergI and Anastalpo, the first
amendment right of freedom of association was subordinated to
the state interest of insuring that only persons of good moral
character be admitted to the bar without a close examination by
the Court as to whether that interest was actually being served
by the regulatory practice involved.
The fact that these cases represent a break in any pattern
that might have been set in Schware and KonigsbergI is important in considering the stance of the organized bar in relation to
later court decisions. Konigsberg 11 and Anastalpo gave the
Court's stamp of approval to the practice of denying applications
to the bar based on a refusal to answer questions asked by an
investigating committee. Refusal alone was enough, regardless of
whether or not that refusal actually resulted in a frustration of the
valid goals of the state interest involved. And even though later
decisions in other areas regularly gave pre-eminence to first
amendment rights over the regulatory interests of the organized
bar, this practice continued until it was expressly declared unconstitutional in 1971.136 This ten year delay in changing an internal
policy is indicative of the general tendency of the organized bar
to change only so much of its regulatory processes as is specifically required by Supreme Court decisions.
The same pattern can be seen in the area of a lawyer's fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. In Cohen v.
Hurley,'37 another 1961 case, the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment did not forbid the state from making an attorney's
refusal to answer questions from an inquiry board per se grounds
for disbarment, even if the refusal rested on a bona fide claim of
privilege against self-incrimination. Although this case was de3 which extended the application
cided before Malloy v. Hogan,"'
of the fifth amendment to the states through the fourteenth
amendment for citizens generally, Cohen was not expressly over135. Id. at 97-116. The long dissent by Justice Black gives considerable detail about
the various meetings between Anastalpo and the Committee, quoting from the record of
those meetings in several places, and the evidence-or lack of it-that determined the
Committee's decision to reject Anastalpo's application.
136. Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (applicant refused to answer
questions about possible association with the Communist Party).
137. 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
138. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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ruled by Malloy in specific language. The result was that the bar
continued to enforce disbarment on the basis of Cohen, distinguishing the case from Malloy in that Malloy was not a member
of the bar and that investigative committee hearings were not
state criminal actions. It took another Supreme Court decision,' 39
three years after Malloy, to extend fifth amendment protection
expressly to lawyers involved in disciplinary proceedings.
This pattern of resistance to change in the policies and procedures of the organized bar continued even after the Canons of
Professional Ethics themselves began to fall under first amendment scrutiny. The reaction of the bar to Supreme Court decisions affecting the bar's internal regulation has been to alter its
approach to conform only to the extent that it must, ignoring
later analagous court decisions, until the Supreme Court again
addresses a specific question and rules directly on that particular
practice or policy. Although a conservative approach is a normal
pattern for court-determined expansions of individual rights in
general,4 0 it is somewhat contradictory to the concept of professional self-regulation. It is difficult to contend that the legal profession is one that regulates itself when the major changes in that
regulatory effort come in the form of Supreme Court orders for
change, rather than from the internal mechanisms and processes
of the profession.
Just as in the case of internal bar procedures, there was a
time when the Canons of Professional Ethics were accepted by
both the bar and the courts as the primary authority for the
regulation of the profession. In 1955, for example, the Canons
were cited as controlling law for the decision of cases."' Fact
situations were examined in light of the precepts of the Canons,
and rights of attorneys were determined accordingly. But in the
1963 case of NAACP v. Button,' the Supreme Court was confronted with a situation in which the Canons were directly chal139. Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
140. Cf., e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (cases illustrating the development
of the right to counsel in criminal prosecution).
141. See, e.g., Harmar Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 239 F.2d
555 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957); Laskey Bros., Inc. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955); Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Cir.
Mgmt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d dir. 1954); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp.
345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
142. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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lenged on first amendment grounds. Specifically, Canons 35 and
47,'11 dealing with solicitation, were under attack. The Canons of
Professional Ethics had been adopted by the Supreme Court of
Virginia and incorporated into the rules of court. Chapter 33 of
the Virginia Code, which included Canons 35 and 47, was the
basis for charges of criminal solicitation against the NAACP and
its legal staff. This legal staff was maintained for the purpose of
advising the members of the NAACP of their legal rights and
assisting them in exercising those rights through the courts. In
this landmark decision, the Court found that chapter 33 of the
Virginia Code, and therefore Canons 35 and 47, was unconstitutionally overbroad. The activities of the NAACP and its legal
staff were modes of expression and association and, therefore, fell
under the protection of the first amendment. The state of Virginia
could not prohibit this activity through its authority for regulating the legal profession by calling it improper solicitation of legal
business. By way of footnote, the Court made a significant comment that reflected a change in attitude as to the status of the
Canons in the scheme of authority over the actions of attorneys:
It is unclear-and immaterial-whether the Virginia
court's opinion is to be read as holding that NAACP's activities
violated the Canons because they violated Chapter 33, or as
reinforcing its holding that Chapter 33 was violated by finding
an independent violation of the Canons. Our holding that petitioner's activities are constitutionally protected applies equally
whatever the source of Virginia's attempted prohibition.'
143.
CANON

35. INTERMEDIARIES

The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should
avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest
of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and

the responsibility should be direct to the client. Charitable societies rendering
aid to the indigent are not deemed such intermediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association, club or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter in
which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employment should
not include the rendering of legal services to the members of such an organization in respect to their individual affairs. (As amended 8/31/33).
144.
CANON

47.

AiDING THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACrIcE OF LAW

No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be used in
aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency,
personal or corporate. (Adopted 9/30/37).
145. 371 U.S. at 429 n.11.
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Evidently refusing to accept the Court's position, the bar
continued to litigate the same issue in similar situations in 1964146
and again in 1967,'11 in cases involving attempts by labor unions
to provide legal services to their members. Each case ended with
the same result. The state interest involved, the protection of the
integrity of the profession, simply did not outweigh the individual
rights of freedom of association and expression that were encroached upon by the regulation. These rulings, combined with
the weakening of procedural policies discussed earlier, led to the
revision of the Canon of Professional Ethics."' The resulting Code
of Professional Responsibility was more detailed and specific
than its predecessor. But the new Code has not been immune
from attack. As shown by Bates, the first time the Supreme Court
has had reason to weigh the state interest embodied in the Code
against first amendment rights, the first amendment protection
weighs heavier in the balance. But there are indications in the
Bates decision that the Court may be softening in its approach
to this conflict between state interests and constitutional rights
in regulating the legal profession. The Bates decision was delivered in limiting terms. This is quite different from the broad
announcements that effectively abolished the old Canons 35 and
47.1'1 Also, the Court weighed very carefully the legitimate values
that must be considered, rather than declaring the sanctity of the
first amendment in absolutist terms. And the Court has clearly
left the formulation of new rules for regulating lawyers advertis146. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964)
(union program for advising injured workers to seek legal counsel, recommending specific

lawyers).
147. UMW, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (union hired
attorney on salaried basis to assist members in processing workmen's compensation
claims).

148. See generally Preface to ABA

CODE.

149. UMW, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood

of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); and NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) were all premised on the supremacy of the first amendment
right of assembly over any state interest in regulating the legal profession. The Court made
the statement in United Mine Workers that:
We start with the premise that the rights to assemble

. . .

are among the

most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. . . . We have
therefore repeatedly held that laws which actually affect the exercise of these
vital rights cannot be sustained merely because they were enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative competence, or even
because the laws do in fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil.
389 U.S. at 222.
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ing to the bar, indicating that the majority, at least, has some
measure of confidence that the bar is capable of reconciling the
previous conflict between state interest and first amendment
rights in formulating the new rules. In effecting this reconciliation, however, the bar must take into consideration the presumption that the Court has developed in favor of individual
rights in the balancing process, and it must provide rules for
lawyer advertising that do not infringe on protected rights. This
consideration would indicate that the bar should avoid taking a
restrictive approach in formulating the new rules, since specific
restrictions are more likely to offend first amendment rights.
In addition to the consideration of constitutional issues,
there is another influence that suggests that the bar should avoid
a restrictive approach, and that is the impact of antitrust laws
on the legal profession. The area in which the courts first hinted
at possible antitrust application to the regulation of the bar was
in connection with the enforcement of Canon 4 of the Code, which
deals in part with conflicts of interest. An attorney has access to
confidential information from his clients and, therefore, should
not engage in litigation against a former client, according to
Canon 4. The fact that this canon was never made an object of a
Justice Department attack under the antitrust laws is possibly
due to changes the courts made in the test to be used in the
application of Canon 4.
The predecessors of Canon 4 of the Code were the old Canons
615 and 37,151 which were the controlling authority for the disqual150.
CANON

6.

ADVERSE INFLUENCES AND CONFLICTMG INTERESTS

It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all
the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of
counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf
of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of
retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest
of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed. (Adopted
8/27/08).
151.
CANON 37. CONFMENCES OF A CLIENT
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty
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ification of plaintiffs' attorneys in several antitrust suits brought
during the 1950's against the motion picture industry.' 52 One at-

torney, Malkan, was disqualified in no less than three suits of this
kind.' 53 The test used for determining whether his representation
of the plaintiff constituted a conflict of interest was a mechanical

match-up of time periods and legal associations. The fact that a
former partner had been associated with another firm at a time
when the defendants were represented by that firm, served to
disqualify Malkan, the former partner, and a subsequent partner
from prosecuting claims against those defendants several years
later. There was an irrebutable presumption in such cases that
confidences were exchanged during each association. 54' The
outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees; and
neither of them should accept employment which involves or may involve the
disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private advantage of the
lawyer or his employees or to the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there are other available sources of such
information. A lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers that
this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his
new client.
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclosing the
truth in respect to the accusation. The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which he is bound to respect.
He may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act
or protect those against whom it is threatened. (As amended 9/30/37).
152. See, e.g., Harmar Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 239 F.2d
555 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,355 U.S. 824 (1957); Fisher Studio v. Loew's Inc., 232 F.2d
199 (2d Cir. 1955); Laskey Bros., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824 (2d
Cir. 1955); Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Cir. Mgmt.-Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1954).
153. Harmar,Fisher, and Lashey, note 152 supra.
154. Malkan was a practicing attorney who took on a younger partner named Isacson
in 1952. Isacson had formerly been employed by the firm of Sargoy & Stein, who had as
clients many of the motion picture companies. The firm of Malkan & Isacson filed suit in
the Fisher case, but both were disqualified because of Isacson's former association with
Sargoy & Stein. The Malkan & Isacson partnership was dissolved, and Malkan formed a
new partnership with Mr. Ellner. The partnership of Malkan & Ellner filed the Laskey,
(and its companion case, Austin Theater, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.) and Harmar
suits. Both were disqualified in the Laskey suit because the case came to Malkan before
the dissolution of the Isacson partnership (knowledge of one partner was imputed to the
other so that Malkan was disqualified because of Isacson's possible knowledge, and Ellner
was disqualified by the association with Malkan-all of this possible knowledge stemming
from possible confidences Isacson might have been exposed to at Sargoy & Stein). Disqualification was not granted in the Austin case, though the dissenting opinion felt it was
absolutely necessary, because the case came to the Malkan & ElIner firm from channels
not connected with Isacson. Disqualification did result in the Harmarcase because 50%
of the plaintiff's corporation was owned by the same family that owned another corporation that had retained Malkan & Isacson at one time. The taint stemmed from that time
and continued with the clients even in later, unrelated matters. It was noted that the
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change in the test used by the courts in recent years has shifted
away from irrebutable presumptions that confidences were
gained purely by associations, to a test which includes a closer
scrutiny of the facts of each case. The lawyer has the opportunity
to rebut the inference that he is in possession of confidential
information, and the subject matter of the suit and the issues
involved are examined to see if they are substantially related to
the former representation.15
The 1973 case of Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp.,' compared to the Malkan cases, illustrates more
than just the difference between associations in a large firm and
association in a partnership. The actual test the court applies
goes beyond an association analysis and into a facts and evidence
analysis. Again, this change in the interpretation of the dictates

of Canon 4 has come from court decisions rather than from internal clarification by the bar.157 This development in Canon 4 cases
is important in the consideration of antitrust applications in the
regulation of the legal profession because the cases indicate early
misgivings by the court that the effect and operation of Canon 4
has antitrust overtones. In a dissenting opinion to one of the
Malkan cases, Chief Judge Clark warned against "the dangers of
using legal ethics as a club to protect monopolists or harass complainers"'' 8 and went on to say:
partnership of Malkan & Ellner 'understandably' had dissolved before the appeal of this
case was decided, so the order was modified on appeal to disqualify only Malkan personally.
155. Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973); Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (D.C.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518
F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975) (includes a survey and summary of cases on this issue).
156. 370 F. Supp. 581 (D.C.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
157. When the ABA revised the old Canons, there was opportunity to give some
definite guidelines for determining when a conflict of interest in employment exists, or
for judging before accepting employment whether a conflict is likely to occur; but this was
not done. Ethical Consideration 4-5 includes one sentence for the lawyer's guidance on
this issue: "Care should be exercised by a lawyer to prevent the disclosure of the confidences and secrets of one client to another, and no employment should be accepted that
might require such disclosure." Note 7 refers the reader to an ABA Opinion from 1936 that
is little more instructive as to what a lawyer is to consider when accepting clients: "[A]n
attorney must not accept professional employment against a client or a former client
which will, or even may require him to use confidential information obtained by the
attorney in the course of his professional relations with such client regarding the subject
ABA COMM. ON PROFFSSIONAL ETMCS,OPINIONS, No. 165
matter of the employment.
(1936).
158. Harmar Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 239 F.2d 555, 559
(2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957).
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The only definite sameness [in the cases and defendants in
issue] I find is that all start with the famous Paramount decree.
But so does all litigation in this area at the present time. In short
what this decision really means is that Malkan is barred from
this profitable area of antitrust litigation for the foreseeable
future.
I find the result here quite unfair to young lawyers attempting to break into substantial practice and undesirable in policy
as helping to safeguard monopoly." 9
In Silver, United States District Court Judge Weinstein was
more direct in stating a possible relationship between the operation of Canon 4 and antitrust problems. He observed that the
practice of law is one of the few remaining professions in which
young people can begin a career without substantial initial capital. With the growth of large firms and the trend to specialization,
a strict application of the rule would be unnecessarily restrictive
on new lawyers. A starting lawyer's future could be severely restricted by associating with large firms early in his career.
Antitrust implications in unduly restricting the work of the largest law firm's former associates are not insubstantial since these
firms have as clients corporations that control a major share of
the American economy. . . . Large law firms may not protect
their clients by monopolizing young talent. The Canons of Ethics furnish no warrant for illegal restraints on trade. 6 '
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Weinstein's
ruling in Silver, but disagreed by way of footnote with the antitrust comment.
We cannot endorse Judge Weinstein's comments . . . pertaining to the possible antitrust implications of limitations on
the ability of associates to represent interests opposing clients
of former firms. The Supreme Court presently has pending before it a question of the Sherman Act's application to the legal
profession and, in particular, minimum fee schedules. Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, No. 74-70 [420 U.S. 944, 95 Sup. Ct. 1323,
43 L. Ed. 2d 422] (argued April 1, 1975). Whatever the decision
in that case, we would think it inappropriate to relax ethical
standards directed at preserving a sound attorney client rela159. Id. at 559-60.
160. 370 F. Supp. at 591.
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tionship in the name of the antitrust laws. As long as the
"substantially related" test is employed, we perceive no conflict
between the two."'
The point should be emphasized that the appellate court sees no
conflict between Canon 4 and antitrust laws "[als long as the
'substantially related' test is employed." The court does not say
that it finds no conflict at all. Judge Weinstein's comments may
have been prophetic, however, in that Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar"2 did establish that the legal profession was not exempt from
application of the Sherman Act.
In Goldfarb, the plaintiffs brought a class action against the
Virginia State Bar and the Farfax County Bar Association as coconspirators in the formulation and enforcement of a minimum
fee schedule for common legal services in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 63 The plaintiffs needed a title search in order
to purchase a home in Fairfax County and, by Virginia law, only
a member of the state bar could legally perform this service."
After sending inquiries to thirty-seven Fairfax County lawyers,
the plaintiffs were unable to find one lawyer who would charge
less than the minimum rate fixed by the fee schedule. The legal
profession clearly had a monopoly on title searches, and there was
obvious agreement among members of the profession that there
would be a minimum fee for providing this service, but the bar
argued that the Sherman Act did not apply to the legal profession. The Supreme Court found for the plaintiffs and held that
the minimum fee schedule was a form of price fixing in violation
of the Sherman Act.
There were three arguments put forth in Goldfarb for the
contention that this action by the bar was exempt from the application of the Sherman Act. The first was that the antitrust laws
only apply to restraints on trade or commerce. The practice of law
is a profession and, by definition, professions are not engaged in
trade or commerce; therefore, the Sherman Act does not apply to
the legal profession. The second argument was that the Sherman
Act applies only to restraints on trade or commerce that affect
interstate commerce. A title search is a local service, an intrastate
161. 518 F.2d at 757-58 n.9.
162. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
163. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
164. Unauthorized Practice of Law, Opinion No. 17, Aug. 5, 1942, Virginia State
Bar-Opinions 239 (1965), cited in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 775 n.1.
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activity, not interstate commerce. The third argument was that
the state action exemption of Parker v. Brown' 5 would prevent
the legal profession from being subject to antitrust attack because
the regulation of individual lawyers is ultimately in the hands of
the state courts. These rules and procedures of the bar have no
enforceable validity unless adopted or approved by the state supreme courts. The court then delegates administrative duties to
the bar for enforcement of those rules, so that the bar is acting
as a state agency under the direction of the court in its enforcement procedures. All three arguments were rejected by the Court
in Goldfarb on the facts of that case.
The first argument was rejected by pointing out that the
language of section 1 of the Sherman Act contains no exceptions
at all, and that there was nothing in the legislative history of the
Act to support a contention that Congress did not intend to include learned professions within the terms "trade or commerce."
As to the particular legal service the profession was providing in
this case, "[w]hatever else it may be, the examination of a land
title is a service; the exchange of such a service for money is
'commerce' in the most common usage of that word. ' 166
The second argument was rejected by the Court on the basis
that the title search was a practical necessity in buying property
because all lenders require title searches as assurance of a lien on
a valid title before they provide financing. This results in the title
search being generally an inseparable part of a real estate transaction. Real estate transactions are a part of interstate commerce
in that a significant amount of funds furnished for the purchase
of homes in the locality come from outside the state in the form
of VA and FHA loans. "Where, as a matter of law or practical
necessity, legal services are an integral part of an interstate transaction, a restraint on those services may substantially affect commerce for Sherman Act purposes."'6 7
The rejection of the third argument, the state action exemption, involves a more complex analysis, and a review of the state
action doctrine is necessary to understand the clarification of that
doctrine as represented in Goldfarb. In 1943, the Supreme Court
decided Parkerv. Brown, establishing the criterion used for determining whether an activity that was in fact a restraint on trade
165. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
166. 421 U.S. at 787.
167. Id. at 785.
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or commerce would, nevertheless, be exempt from the application
of the Sherman Act, because the activity was part of some government program or regulation. The Sherman Act did not apply to
the actions of government, because the legislative history of the
Act indicated that the purpose of the Act was to prevent the
economic damage to the public caused by monopolies in the private sector. The presumption is that monopolies created in the
private sector are created for the purpose of enhancing the wealth
of those who conspire to form the monopoly. Monopolies that are
created by government, however, are presumed to be for the purpose of best serving the needs of the people. In Parker, the state
of California had created an Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission,'6 8 which administered programs for marketing agricultural commodities produced in the state, restricting competition
among growers and maintaining prices in the sale of those commodities to packers. The plaintiff was a raisin producer who was
also a purchaser and packer. Because of the implementation of
the prorate system, he was caught in a position of being prevented
from marketing a full season's crop of raisins and prevented from
fulfilling contract obligations in interstate commerce. He filed the
antitrust suit alleging that the program was in violation of the
Sherman Act.
The means by which prorate zones were established in the
program is important in terms of the later Goldfarb decision. A
petition is made to the Commission by not less than ten producers requesting that a prorate marketing plan be established for
any commodity within a defined production zone. After a public
hearing and prescribed economic findings show that such a program for the proposed zone will achieve the desired economic
goals of the program, the Commission may grant the petition.
The Director of Agriculture is then required to "select a program
committee from among nominees chosen by the qualified producers within the zone, to which he may add not more than two
handlers or packers."' 69 This committee then formulates a proration program for the zone, which the Commission is authorized
to approve after a public hearing and a finding that the program
is a reasonable one, calculated to meet the objectives of the act.
The Commission has the authority to modify the program and
168. California Agricultural Prorate Act, June 5, 1933, ch. 754, § 3, p. 1969, 1933 Cal.
Stats., cited in 317 U.S. 341, 344 n.1.
169. 317 U.S. at 346.
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approve it as modified. Once the program is approved by the
Commission, a referendum is held. If 65% of the producers in
the zone, owning 51% of the acreage devoted to the crop being
regulated, approve the program, the Director of Agriculture is
required to declare the program instituted. Authority to administer the program is delegated to the program committee, subject
to approval by the Director. The Parker court held that the program was not a violation of the Sherman Act because it was state
action and, therefore, exempt from the operation of antitrust
laws.
The court reasoned that the program was state action by
considering several points. The state has created the machinery
for establishing the prorate system through the Agricultural Prorate Act. Although the organization of a zone is proposed by producers, and although any program approved by the Commission
must also be approved by a referendum of producers, "it is the
state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program
and which enforces it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a
governmental policy." 7 ' The prerequisite approval by a certain
number of producers is not an imposition of their will on a minority by force of argument or combination because "[t]he state
itself exercises its legislative authority in making the regulation
and prescribing the conditions of its application. The required
vote on the referendum is one of those conditions."' 71
It is understandable that the defendant bar associations in
Goldfarb reasoned that the state action exemption of Parkerwas
analagous to their own situation. By legislative enactment, the
Supreme Court of Virginia was authorized to regulate the prac7 2 The
tice of law in the state.Y
Virginia State Bar, also by legislative enactment,' was authorized to act as a state administrative
agency through which the court implements that regulation. The
Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the Virginia
Supreme Court.' Included in the Code, under Canon 2, were
provisions determining reasonable fees. EC 2-18 stated that fees
vary according to many factors, but "[s]uggested fee schedules
and economic reports of state and local bar associations provide
some guidance on the subject of reasonable fees."' 7 5 Also, DR 2170. Id.at 352.
171. Id.

172.

VA. CODE

§ 54-48 (1972).

173. Id.§ 54-49 (1972).
174. Rules of Court, 211 Va. 295 (1971).
175. Id.at 302.
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106(B) listed as one of eight factors to be considered in avoiding
excessive fees "[tihe fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar services. "176
The Court held that the actions of the bar in Goldfarb did
not constitute state action, and the reasoning of the Court in
distinguishing the case from Parkerrepresents an important development in the state action exemption doctrine. The state bar
did not officially require the use of minimum fee schedules by the
attorneys of the state as members of the state bar. But it did
publish reports by the Committee on Economics of Law Practice
which recommended minimum charges for certain services,1 7 and
it issued ethical opinions that indicated that a lawyer would be
disciplined if he ignored the fee schedule adopted by his local
bar, 7 even if he were not a member of that local voluntary association. The argument of the state bar in Goldfarb was that the
issuance of reports and ethical opinions was merely an implementation of the fee provisions of the ethical codes, and that this is a
part of its function as a state administrative agency. The county
bar argued its action in adopting a fee schedule was prompted by
the ethical codes and the ethical opinions of the state bar, and
thus its actions should also qualify as state action for Sherman
Act purposes. But the Court held:
The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive
activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not
meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the
State acting as sovereign. .

.

.It is not enough that

. . .

anti-

competitive conduct is "prompted" by state action; rather, anticompetitive activity must
be compelled by direction of the
179
State acting as sovereign.

It is significant that the state bar had never taken formal disciplinary action to enforce a fee schedule. If it had, the state supreme
court would have had to rule on the disciplinary action taken.
The problem in Goldfarb was that the required fee schedule was
adopted at the county bar level, approved and reinforced at the
state bar level, and no direct opinion was ever expressed one way
176. Id. at 313.
177. The first such report was published in 1962. In 1969, a revised schedule was
published raising the prices for most services.
178. Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 98, June 1, 1960;
Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 170, May 28, 1971.

179. 421 U.S. at 790-91 (emphasis added).
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or the other by the Supreme Court of Virginia. The authority for
the anticompetitive activity was exerted in the reverse direction
from that required for the state action exemption to apply to the
case.
In 1976, the Supreme Court placed an additional limitation
on the use of the state action exemption in Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co. 8 The anticompetitive practice complained of was the
sale of light bulbs by the power company to its customers at a
reduced rate. The state action exemption asserted was the fact
that the bulb program was approved as part of the rate structure
fixed by the state. The Court held that the state action claimed
was, in reality, only acquiescence by the state to a practice that
had been going on before state regulation of the power company
had begun and, therefore, not an order by the state compelling
the power company to provide light bulbs for sale to the public.
The real interest of the state was the regulation of the power
company as a public utility, and the implied approval of the bulb
program was only incidental to the primary regulatory interest of
the state.
By the time Bates was considered, the state action exemption doctrine had developed into a three-part requirement:
(1) A state regulation must be present which authorizes the
anticompetitive activity;
(2) That state regulation must directly order and compel the
anticompetitive activity to be carried on; and
(3) The anticompetitive activity must be related to the primary purpose for regulation by the state of the party engaged
in such activity.
There was no dissent to the Bates holding that the state
action exemption of Parker did apply to restraints on advertising
endorsed and administered by the state bar. This is entirely consistent with the three-part test outlined above. The state regulation was present with the adoption of the Code by the Supreme
Court of Arizona. The state regulation did directly compel and
order the anticompetitive activity, as witnessed by the very disciplinary action on appeal. And, the restriction on public advertising by lawyers directly related to the regulation of the legal profession by the state. The Court made the point even stronger by
expressly characterizing the Arizona Supreme Court as being the
180. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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real party in interest, not the Arizona Bar, because it is the rules
of the court that are being enforced through the administrative
181
machinery of the bar.
The Bates decision apparently rebuffs any attempts by the
Justice Department to invalidate the policies of the bar as they
are embodied in the Code through antitrust attacks. But it is
important to note that the Justice Department filed an amicus
curiae brief in Bates182endorsing the application of the state action exemption of Parker v. Brown.' This seems contradictory
considering that the Justice Department filed an antitrust action
against the ABA in June 1976, alleging that, by recommending
its Code of Professional Responsibility rules for regulating lawyer
publicity, the ABA was engaging in a conspiracy to restrain competition among lawyers.' In the amicus curiae brief, the Justice
Department did say that the Arizona rule violated the substantive standards of the Sherman Act, but that it could not be challenged only because the rule was promulgated by the court.",
The Justice Department has announced its intention to proceed with further antitrust actions including the suit filed in 1976,
insisting that the issue has not been mooted by Bates, since the
focus of the suit is on an alleged private agreement and not state
regulation.'8
In making this distinction, the Justice Department recognizes that the organized bar wears two hats at the state level: one
as a state agency enforcing the rules of the court and another as
an independent professional organization. Perhaps the Justice
Department plans to continue litigation under antitrust laws in
an attempt to get greater clarification from the courts as to where
the demarcation lines fall in distinguishing when the bar is acting
as a state agency, as in Bates, and when it is acting as a private
organization making agreements that are subject to antitrust violations, as in Goldfarb. The full range of activities in which the
state bars involve themselves are too numerous and too complex
for all the questions in this area to have been answered in
Goldfarb and Bates.
181. 97 S. Ct. at 2697.
182. 97 S. Ct. 729 (1977).
183. Bar Antitrust Problems Still Linger Despite Bates, 63 A.B.A.J. 1067 (1977).

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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Another distinction pertinent to the Justice Department action is that the ABA and the state bar organizations are not
synonymous entities. While this may be readily apparent when
examining internal conflicts or disagreements within the profession, the distinction is not as clear when considering the defenses
to be made to attacks from outside the profession. For instance,
the defense maintained by.the ABA in response to the filing of
the June 1976 suit is basically grounded in two doctrines.187 The
first is a variation on the state action exemption doctrine. The
ABA does not restrict or prevent advertising, because it has no
power to do so. The Code of Professional Responsibility has no
enforceable effect on the individual attorney unless it is adopted
by the state body responsible for the regulation of the legal profession in his or her state. There is no enforcement of the Code
without state action. The second defense is based on the so-called
Noerr doctrine.' The right of an organization to petition government was held to be a right which transcends antitrust considerations in Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight,Inc. "I The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held
that the Sherman Act has no application to attempts to influence
the passage or enforcement of laws and "[s]uch a construction
of the Sherman Act would raise important constitutional questions. The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the
Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms."'" Relying on this doctrine, the ABA contends that its attempts to have the Code
adopted in the several states are a protected political activity and
not subject to antitrust prohibitions.
The weakness in the first defense is the attempt to ignore the
actual focus of the antitrust laws. In an antitrust case the issue
is not whether the conspirator has the authority to enforce a
restraint on trade or commerce, but whether the actions taken by
the conspirator have the effect of restraining trade or commerce.
The weakness of the second defense is directly tied to the
previously mentioned distinctions between the ABA and state bar
187. Letter from Lawrence E. Walsh, President of the ABA, to Members of the House
of Delegates (June 25, 1976).
188. For a more detailed discussion of the Noerr doctrine and its possible application
to the legal profession, pre-Bates, see Bane, Truckin' on Down to the American Bar
Association or Can Noerr be Ignored?, 21 ANTRrUST BULL. 629 (1976).
189. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
190. Id. at 138.
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organizations. The Noerr doctrine shields the right to petition
government from the application of the Sherman Act, but is the
ABA really involved in the petitioning of government? The Justice Department's position is that it is not. The state bar organizations are involved in petitioning government. The ABA is involved in petitioning the state bar organizations. The question to
be answered in future litigation is whether the Noerr doctrine will
still apply if the restraining activity is once-removed from the
actual petitioning of government. In this context, the motivation
for the amicus curiae brief in Bates begins to make sense. The
Justice Department would like to have the distinction between
state bar activities and ABA activities as sharply defined as possible before the application of the Noerr doctrine is tested in the
courts.
The conflict between the concept of self-regulation of the
profession and antitrust attacks on the organized bar is far from
being resolved. The profession can expect more litigation in the
antitrust area in an attempt to settle the rights and the limitations of power on both sides of the conflict.
The combined effect of the constitutional issues discussed
earlier in this section and the application of antitrust laws to the
legal profession has seriously weakened the authority, ability, and
justifications for self-regulation by the legal profession. Now the
bar has been given the responsibility of formulating effective
rules for regulating lawyer advertising. The ABA and the state
bar associations are faced with a complex problem in determining
an approach to the formulation of those rules. Even if the Noerr
doctrine is held to apply to the ABA, it would be unwise to adopt
and petition for a plan of regulation that violates first amendment rights of free speech and association. The result would still
be a set of regulations that are illegal under either antitrust law
or first amendment protections. These considerations dictate that
the organized bar take a liberal, unrestrictive approach to the
formulation of regulations covering lawyer advertising.
At the same time, another government agency enters into the
considerations that the bar must take into account-the Federal
Trade Commission. The influence of this agency has more immediate impact on the individual lawyer than do the considerations
of constitutional issues and antitrust concerns in relation to the
organized bar. For this reason, if no other, the influence of the
FTC must be given serious consideration in formulating rules
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that will affect the individual attorney so directly in the daily
operation of his practice.
B.

The Federal Trade Commission: A Force that Calls for a
Restrictive Approach Toward Lawyer Advertising

When the Bates and O'Steen advertisement appeared in a
newspaper in Arizona, it could be argued that the legal profession
technically came under the regulating authority of the FTC.
There is no doubt that when the Court ruled that the bar against
advertising must be lifted and lawyer advertisements began appearing around the country, the FTC automatically had authority to assume control of the regulation of lawyer advertising.
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act,' 9 Congress has given
19 2
the FTC broad powers to regulate commercial practices to protect the public from false or misleading advertisements,' 3 and
this should apply with equal force to the legal profession.'94 The
legal profession has entered the world of advertising, where the
FTC has already established the controlling laws. The FTC has
the power to formulate Trade Regulation Rules which can be used
effectively to regulate the conduct of entire industries.9 5 The dis191. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).

192. Id. § 45.
193. Id. § 52.
194. Section 45(a)(6) of the Act specifies exceptions to the power of the Commission
to regulate certain types of business, all of which are subject to regulation by some other
federal agency; banks, common carriers, air carriers, and "persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended,
except as provided in section 406(b) of said Act" are exempt from FTC control. The
insurance business was declared exempt from federal regulation in the McCarranFerguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970), but provision was made in § 1012(b) that the
FTC Act (and the Sherman and Clayton Acts) would be applicable to the extent that the
business is not regulated by state laws. With such specific exceptions made by Acts of
Congress, it is obvious that the congressional intent of the FTC Act was that it would
apply to all unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. There is even some doubt
as to whether the Parker v. Brown state action exemption is applicable to the FTC portion
of the antitrust laws. See Badal, Restrictive State Laws and the Federal Trade
Commission, 29 AD.L. REv. 239 (1977).

195. The Commission has used the Trade Regulation Rules to regulate industries by
setting out detailed specifications and standards to be followed in that trade or industry.
A violation of a trade regulation rule is not a violation of § 5, but if the Commission proves
that a trade regulation has been violated, this is prima facie evidence that § 5 was
violated. This practice was approved in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482
F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951, which held that the Commission had
the authority to promulgate trade regulation rules which have the effect of substantive
law.
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cussion in this section is addressed to the problems that would
be encountered in trying to apply the standards developed by the
FTC for determining whether advertisements are false or misleading to the regulation of legal advertising.
Basically, the FTC has taken a very protective approach
toward the consumer, resulting in the development of severe, and
often seemingly unrealistic, standards for evaluating the deceptiveness of advertising. Neither actual damage to the public nor
actual deception to any consumer need be shown for an advertisement to be declared deceptive by the FTC. "' The advertisement
is examined to see if it has the capacity to deceive. 9 The Act is
violated if the advertisement induces the first contact through
deception, even if the buyer later becomes fully informed before
entering the contract.198 If an advertisement is capable of being
interpreted in a misleading way, it will be construed against the
advertiser.'99 If there is an ambiguity of terms used in an advertisement and one meaning is false, the advertisement is false.es
Advertising may be false both for the statements and representations it actually makes and for those that it fails to make."9 1
196. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 79 (1934); Resort Car Rental Sys. v.
FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1975); Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59, 62 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974); Floersheim v. FTC, 411 F.2d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 1969);
Exposition Press v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917
(1962); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 896 (9th Cir. 1960); Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d
741, 745 (4th Cir. 1959); Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 604 (9th Cir. 1957); Progress
Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1946); General Motors Corp. v. FrC,
114 F.2d 33, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1940).
197. The holding in this line of cases, that actual damage or deception need not be
shown, is consistent with the finding that an advertisement need only have the capacity
to deceive to be labeled deceptive.
198. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive, 380 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1965); Resort Car Rental v.
FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1975); Exposition Press v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 873 (2d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962); Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821,
824 (7th Cir. 1951); Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103, 104 (7th Cir. 1946).
199. Resort Car Rental v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1975); Murray Space Shoe
Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d
952, 954 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960).
200. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 80 (1934); Waltham Precision Instruments Co. v. FTC, 327 F.2d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 1964); Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC,
304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962); Royal Oil Corp. v. FrC, 262 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1959);
Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1953), rev'd on othergrounds,
348 U.S. 940 (1955); C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. FTC, 197 F.2d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 1952).
201. Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59, 63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974);
Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 1960); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d
952, 954 (2d Cir. 1960); Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741, 744 (4th Cir. 1959); Aronb erg
v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 168 (7th Cir. 1942).
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Standards such as these, used to evaluate the deceptiveness of
advertising, lead to some extreme rulings by the FTC which have
been upheld by the federal appellate courts. For example:
(1) The use of "Dollar-a-Day" as a trade name for a car rental
agency was found to be misleading, and the FTC issued a cease
and desist order forbidding the company to use the trade
name.202
(2) A radio advertisement that a certain deodorant "stopped"
perspiration, the first contact between buyer and seller, was
held deceptive because the buyer had no means of knowing that
the directions printed on the carton and jars called for daily use
or use as frequently as needed.03
(3) Because of the ambiguity of the word "for," an advertisement for medicinal preparations is false if2it4 says the preparation is "for" a disorder that it cannot cure.
(4) An offer of an apparently unconditional free trial purchase
to "new credit customers" was not unconditional because the
"new credit customer" had to be approved for credit. 0 '
Such rulings result from the standard used by the FTC for determining whether the advertisement has the capacity to mislead.
The standard used in FTC evaluations is not the standard of the
reasonable man. The FTC does not ask, "Would a reasonable
consumer be misled by this advertisement?" The FTC approach
is that section 5 was meant for the protection of the ignorant
consumer, 2 1 so the capacity for deception is evaluated by its pos202. Resort Car Rental v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1975).
203, Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1951).
204. Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1953); Aronberg v. FTC,
132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
205. Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974).
In his dissent, Judge Pell stated, "If for no other reason, the order of the FTC should be
set aside by this court because of the utter triviality of the matter involved." Id. at 65.
Judge Pell took issue with the finding that Spiegel's advertisement was against public
interest, in that
the FTC has in effect found there was detriment to the public interest in the
situation of deadbeats being deceived into thinking that they are going to
receive a free trial of, or a discount on, merchandise which they could not
realistically purchase on either a cash or a deferred basis.
Id.
206. In earlier cases, the courts used more of a reasonable man standard. See, e.g.,
Indiana Quartered Oak v. FTC, 26 F.2d 340, 342 (2d Cir. 1928); John C. Winston Co. v.
FTC, 3 F.2d 961, 962 (3d Cir. 1925). In 1934, Justice Cardozo stated that the buyer had a
right to get what he chooses regardless of whether his choice was made from caprice, from
the dictates of fashion, or even through ignorance. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S.
67, 78 (1934). As time passed, the average consumer became less reasonable and more
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sible effects on the unlearned and gullible,1 7 the most ignorant
and unsuspecting" of consumers.
It is obvious that the word "misleading," when used by the
FTC, is not used in the plain and ordinary meaning of the word.
If the present FTC standards for misleading advertising were
applied to legal advertising, the practical result would, in effect,
be a return to the absence of legal advertising. If a lawyer wanted
to list more than his name, address, and the fact that he was an
attorney, it would be impossible to develop an effective advertisement for legal services that would pass such tests for deception.
There is a risk that the average, presumably reasonable, consumer does not know enough about legal procedures and his own
legal needs to prevent his misunderstanding some parts of a legal
advertisement. That risk is increased to certainty when the standard to be applied in evaluating the capacity of a legal advertisement to mislead is that of the ignorant and gullible consumer.
This is further complicated by the fact that common justifications for taking the risk in legal advertising of some deception
based on a lack of knowledge have been expressly rejected as
defenses in FTC actions, namely: (1) The deception that induced
the contract can be corrected before the consumer enters into any
contractual agreement;2 9 and (2) the advertisement is needed as
21
a service to the consumer. 1

To provide realistic regulation of legal advertisements, the
FTC would have to develop a different set of standards for application to the legal profession. The FTC law of advertising was
developed to deal with the problems of advertising products in a
commercial setting in which the sale of that product represents
the total identity of the business being conducted. The only contact between the producer and the consumer revolves around that
sale. In legal advertising, the purpose of the advertisement is to
make an initial contact, and the real interest of both parties is
the satisfactory continuation of the ensuing attorney-client relaignorant. Exposition Press v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
917 (1962); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 897 (9th Cir. 1960); Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC,
153 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1946); Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945);
Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942); General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114
F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940).
207. Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 897 (9th Cir. 1960).
208. Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1946).
209. See note 81 supra.
210. Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59, 64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974).
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tionship. The consumer has a greater opportunity to evaluate
whether he is satisfied with the service he is receiving for his
money. Getting divorced, setting up trusts, making wills, and
filing lawsuits cannot be equated with impulse buying in response
to deceptive marketing practices.
Considering the problems involved in applying FTC standards to legal advertising, the FTC may choose to avoid the problem altogether. The goals of the organized bar and the goals of
the FTC are the same: the dissemination of information to the
public without deception. If the organized bar can provide an
effective means of reaching this common goal, the FTC may prefer to leave regulation of lawyer advertising to the profession. The
FTC has the authority to step in at any time to correct a deceptive practice, 21' so it has the option of waiting to see if the profession provides effective regulations before attempting to assume
control of legal advertising. Given the approach to advertising
already taken by the FTC, an effort to conform to the protective
attitude of the FTC toward the consumer would indicate that the
bar should attempt to exercise very tight control over individual
attorneys in the reformulation of Canon 2.
C.

Conclusion

The organized bar has been increasingly subjected to forces
of outside regulation in recent years. The revision of Canon 2
represents a critical point in the efforts of the bar to maintain
self-regulation. The approach that is taken in the revision will
determine the content of the rules that ultimately will be applied
to practicing lawyers. The application of those rules will also
ultimately determine to what extent the profession will be allowed to continue regulating itself. The problem is that the forces
of outside regulation are not all pushing in the same direction. In
the reformulation of Canon 2, there is one controlling question:
should the bar take the nonrestrictive approach indicated by first
amendment considerations and the antitrust laws or the more
restrictive approach indicated by the influence of the FTC as a
possible force of regulation for the profession?
211. The lumber industry in general had been trading a botanically yellow pine
(pinus ponderosa) under the designation name of California White Pine for over 30 years
when the FTC declared the practice deceptive. Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo
stated "There is no bar through lapse of time to a proceeding in the public interest to set
an industry in order by removing the occasion for deception or mistake. . . ." FTC v.
Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 80 (1934).
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IV.

IMPACT OF CANON

2:

SOME PROBLEM AREAS

The concerns of this section are twofold. The first is to provide a comparative analysis and evaluation of the ABA's newly
adopted post-Bates Canon 2 (called Proposal "A" in draft form)
with its variant (Proposal "B"), which was also considered by the
Task Force on Lawyer Advertising and was ultimately rejected. 2,
The second is to survey, with some emphasis on potential problem areas, the various state bar association attempts to provide
guidelines on lawyer advertising in the wake of the Bates decision. A comparison of some representative sections of the two
proposed versions of Canon 2 will be dealt with first.
The newly adopted Canon 2, Proposal "A," is characterized
by the Task Force in its Report to the Board of Governors as
regulatory; Proposal "B" is labeled directive. The approach of
Proposal "B" represents a radical departure from the pre-Bates
Canon 2, while Proposal "A" retains many more of the restrictions of the pre-existing canon."1 3
Each proposal reaches essentially the same conclusion with
regard to two issues likely to be of interest to the profession: the
use of electronic media in advertising, and the continued maintenance of the ban on in-person and direct-mail solicitation of
clients. While authorizing prerecorded radio advertisements,
each proposal would presently disallow the use of television." 4
Both proposals would leave open to the states the possibility
that television advertising be allowed in the future if needed to
provide the public with adequate information regarding legal
services. According to the Report to the Board of Governors by
the Task Force on Lawyer Advertising, television advertising
may be allowed in the future only if proper safeguards can be
developed to protect the consumer's interest.2 15 One of the potential areas for abuse pointed out by the Task Force is the concern that the television format might emphasize style over substance. A different position was taken by the Department of
Justice, however, in its urging that all electronic media advertis212. The Task Force on Lawyer Advertising was established by the ABA's Board of
Governors, June 7, 1977, in response to Bates to consider possible proposals to the ABA's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Proposals "A" and "B" are reproduced in
Appendix D. See 46 U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug. 23, 1977).
213. 46 U.S.L.W. at 2.
214. See Proposal "A" EC 2-2 and Proposal "B" DR 2-101 (C-7) in Appendix D.
215. 46 U.S.L.W. at 2.
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ing be allowed now."1 ' Despite the Department of Justice position and a recommendation from the ABA Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility that all electronic
media advertising be allowed, the chairman of the Task Force
on Lawyer Advertising said the Task Force could not support
those recommendations because the Task Force had neither the
time nor the expertise to "identify or fully evaluate all the problems involved or to develop appropriate proposed regulation on
lawyer advertising." ' While not completely answering the Justice Department's objections, the ABA's receptiveness to possible future television advertising is an explicit recognition of the
special informational needs of the estimated twenty percent of
the adult population that is functionally illiterate 2l8 and thus unreachable through the conventional print media. Since some
lawyers have already ventured into the area of television advertising,219 it seems unlikely that the states will be able to defer
judgment on this issue for very long.
The traditional ban against in-person solicitation of clients
is continued in both proposals.2 0 However, the dissimilarities in
216. "It is difficult to perceive," maintained the Department of Justice, "why the
identical information contained in a printed advertisement becomes improper when it is
presented over the air." The Justice Department further objected to the fact that television advertising would be disallowed until proven necessary:
Such a shift in the burden of proof seems clearly inappropriate in the absence
of a strong showing that electronic media advertising is inherently harmful.
Such a showing has not been made, and may well be impossible to make. Until
such time, we believe that the use of electronic media should be permitted
subject to the same types of regulations as are applicable to other forms of
advertising.
Letter from John H. Shenfield, Acting Asst. Att'y Gen. of the Antitrust Div. of Dep't of
Justice, to F. LaMar Forshee, Director, Center for Professional Discipline, ABA, (Aug. 3,
1977), at 3.
The South Carolina Bar Report of the Subcommittee on Professional Standards to
the Professional Responsibility Committee recommended that both television and radio
advertisements be allowed. Basically the same information could be conveyed on radio
and television as in the print media. However, the communication of fee information
would be further restricted to the advertisement of three particulars: (1) Whether credit
card or other credit arrangements are accepted; (2) fee for an initial consultation; (3) the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees and/or an estimate of the fee to be
charged for specific services. See DR 2-101(B)lI of recommended Canon 2 appended to
South Carolina Bar Report.
217. Statement of S. Shepherd Tate, before the House of Delegates of ABA, Chicago,
I1. (Aug. 10, 1977). Transcript at 3-4.
218. 46 U.S.L.W. at 2.
219. See Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
220. DR 2-103 in Proposals "A" and "B," Appendix D. The issue of in-person solicitation will soon be before the United States Supreme Court in an appeal from the South
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the range of proscribed lawyer conduct in each merits consideration. Each starts from the same basic position: the lawyer shall
not "recommend employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a layperson [non-lawyer in "B"]
who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer. ' 2 ' The ethical considerations of each proposal acknowledge,
however, that under certain circumstances in volunteering information to laypersons, lawyers may be helping to fulfill their professional duty in assisting laypersons to recognize the legal character of their problems. 222 The proposals differ significantly in
advising lawyers of proper conduct once they have helped nonlawyers identify problems as being legal in nature. 22 3 Proposal
"B" recognizes a distinction between intent and result in the
situations in which lawyers give advice, not motivated by a desire
to obtain employment, which subsequently result in their being
asked to represent individuals whom they had advised regarding
22 4
the legal nature of their problems.
In the former situation, the lawyer would intend, in giving
unsolicited advice to the layperson, that he be ultimately employed by the person to whom he gave the legal advice. In the
latter situation, the giving of advice would be motivated by altruistic, service-oriented reasons and not by a desire to be subsequently employed by the layperson to whom he spoke. The ensuing employment relationship would result only incidentally and
at the behest of the layperson. Proposal "B," while stating that
Carolina Supreme Court. In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 233 S.E.2d 301, cert. granted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3179 (Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 77-56) with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 48 Ohio
St.2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976), 46 U.S.L.W. 3179 (Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1650). The
state supreme court held that Ms. Smith
has therefore, violated DR 2-103(D)(5) (a) by attempting to solicit a client. ...
If respondent's contention that her actions were protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution were upheld, it would amount to
a holding that the pertinent provision of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility was unconstitutional, which we are not prepared to do.
233 S.E.2d at 306.
221. DR 2-103(A) of Proposals "A" and "B" in Appendix D.
222. EC 2-3 of Proposals "A" and "B" in Appendix D.
223. Each proposal specifically disallows a lawyer from contacting a non-client for the
purpose of being retained to represent him for compensation. See EC 2-3 of Proposals "A"
and "B" in Appendix D.
224. EC 2-4 of Proposal "B" in Appendix D. Whether a distinction between such
subjective matters as motive and result could ever be adequately proved to an independent observer is open to question. This problem is acknowledged in EC 2-4 of Proposal
"A" but is omitted from Proposal "B."
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subsequent employment as counsel of a lawyer who has volunteered in-person advice "gives at least the appearance of impropriety,"2 '5 does not flatly prohibit the resulting employment relationship. It would only be prohibited where the advice given was
based on claims that were "false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive" ' or involved the use of "coercion, duress, compulsion,
intimidation, threats, unwarranted promises of benefits, overpersuasion, overreaching, or vexatious or harassing conduct."22 '
In contrast to Proposal "B," Proposal "A" explicitly prohibits the formation of an employment relationship that has arisen
from the attorney's giving unsolicited legal advice, ' except in a
very limited range of circumstances: where the layperson is a
close friend, relative, former client in a related matter, or present
client,2 9 or under the auspices of a qualified legal assistance program. 30 While Proposal "B" gives the lawyer certain ethical
guidelines to consider in reaching decisions, Proposal "A" makes
the lawyer participating in the ensuing relationship automatically subject to discipline.
The differing treatment accorded the solicitation issue in the
two proposals is quite characteristic of the different approach of
each proposal to the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary
Rules throughout the canon. Where Proposal "B" guides the
lawyer, Proposal "A" mandates. Ethical Consideration 2-8 exemplifies this. Both variants contain the identical catalog of information which may be included in an advertisement; however,
they are prefaced quite differently. Proposal "A" states flatly,
"Such information includes," whereas Proposal "B" uses the
more suggestive form, "Information that may be helpful in some
situations would include . . . ." The implication that the list
in "B" is not meant to be exhaustive is supported by an analysis
of the sections following the listing of appropriate information.
Proposal "A" EC 2-8 ends with the simple statement, "[S]elf225. Id.
226. DR 2-104(A)(1) of Proposal "B" in Appendix D.
227. DR 2-104(A)(2) of Proposal "B" in Appendix D.
228. DR 2-104(A) of Proposal "A" in Appendix D.
229. DR 2-104(A)(1) of Proposal "A" in Appendix D.
230. DR 2-104(A)(2) of Proposal "A" in Appendix D. In DR 2-103(D) of Proposal "A,"
qualified legal assistance organizations are broken down into (1) legal aid or public defender offices; (2) military legal assistance office; (3) a lawyer referral service operated,

sponsored, or approved by a bar association; (4) any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal service to its members or beneficiaries subject to the

fulfillment of certain numerous conditions specified in subcategories a-g.
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laudation should be avoided." Proposal "B" adds two new sections, EC 2-8A and EC 2-8B, which help elucidate the goals
and purposes of lawyer advertising and stress the need for avoiding deception. This elaboration of the ethical issues involved
would not be necessary if the content of advertisements had been
strictly circumscribed, as in Proposal "A."
Aware that Proposal "A" more rigidly structures lawyer behavior, the drafters include a significant provision in EC 2-10.
This section, not paralleled in Proposal "B," acknowledges that
since society's conception of what is relevant is not static, a mechanism should be provided for the consideration of proposed
changes to the rule. Perhaps this is some indication that the ABA
considers the adoption of Proposal "A" to be a desirable interim
measure, though not necessarily the profession's final stance on
2 31
the right of lawyers to advertise.

While there is, not surprisingly, much overlap in the Ethical
Considerations supporting both versions of the canon, there is a
marked dissimilarity between the two proposals in their respective Disciplinary Rules. In the Ethical Considerations the two
draft proposals often start with the same ethical substructure but
build on to it in different ways.
The handling of EC 2-8, which concerns the informed selection of a lawyer, is illustrative of the point. In pertinent part, EC
2-8 of Proposal "A" reads, "[D]isclosure of relevant information
about the lawyer and his practice may be helpful. A layperson is
best served if the recommendation is disinterested and informed." In contrast, Proposal "B" reads, "[R]estrained publicity may be helpful." The sentence starting with "A layperson is
best served," has been stricken from Proposal "B." After this
231. Many states have yet to revise their codes to make them consistent with Bates.
Although the majority of the states that have made recommendations, or have already
adopted, a new Canon 2, have accepted what is basically Proposal "A," several states have
done otherwise. Idaho's state bar proposal is essentially Proposal "B." The recommendation of the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar Association is unique.
Awaiting adoption by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is a proposal that
goes significantly beyond even the provisions of ABA Proposal "B." It would not only
eliminate the general proscription against advertising, but also remove the bar against
solicitation under most circumstances. One of the guiding hands in drawing up this proposal was Dean Monroe Freedman, former chairperson of the Legal Ethics Committee of
the D.C. Bar. The District of Columbia and the state of Idaho should prove to be significant testing grounds for the theories on the present viability or practicality of Proposal
"B" in terms of a perceived danger to the public from less readily regulated lawyer
advertising.
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divergence, each proposal continues with the same caveat that "a
lawyer should not seek to influence another to recommend his
employment." Each Ethical Consideration starts with the premise that selection of a lawyer should be made on an informed
basis. The proposals differ, however, in the means to this end.
The drafters' handling of certain Disciplinary Rules is no
different. For example, each version of DR 2-101 starts with essentially the same statement: "A lawyer shall not . . . use, or
participate in the use of, any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive [selflaudatory or unfair in Proposal "A"] statement or claim." After
this the proposals diverge radically. Proposal "A" limits the geographic range of the advertisements to areas in which "the lawyer
resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part of the
lawyer's clientele resides." It then sets forth twenty-five categories of information that describe the sum of the information that
can be revealed in advertisements. These twenty-five categories,
while covering a greater scope of information than as a practical
matter could appear in a single ad, by no means exhaust all the
items of information which might prove helpful to the client in
search of a lawyer.2 32 The major provision of Proposal "B" DR 2101 is the aforementioned directive against false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statements coupled with an elaborate set of
guidelines to assist the attorney in deciding for himself what
statements may properly be included in advertisements. This set
of guidelines replaces the exclusive twenty-five categories of Proposal "A."
An argument frequently proffered for the continuation of a
restrictive approach to attorney advertising has centered on an
interpretation of the nature of attorneys as professionals. 21 No232. Information that could prove relevant to a potential consumer of legal services
might include such data as a breakdown on how the lawyer's time was apportioned among
various areas of the law and categories or types rather than just names of clients represented. This data goes beyond what the drafters of Proposal "A" would allow. It is suggested that information presented in this manner might be considerably more helpful to
a potential consumer of legal services than a bare list of client names. The utility of a
listing of fields of law practiced could be enhanced by allowing an indication of a proportional division of time spent in various areas. Further categories are proposed by the
plaintiffs in Consumers Union of United States v. American Bar Ass'n, 427 F. Supp. 506,
522 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 2993 (1977) (in light of Bates).
233. See, e.g., the arguments raised by the appellees in Bates, 97 S. Ct. at 2701. The
proposition that advertising should be disallowed on the ground that competitive communications would have a detrimental effect on the professional nature of attorneys was
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tions of what constitutes "professional" behavior subsume two
partially separable concepts. The first involves a sense of dignity
in the image projected and a concomitant distancing from the
pressures of the marketplace. The second involves the concept of
dedication to the public interest.24 In the advertising situation
the two notions may at times appear to be in conflict. It is primarily the first concept of professional which is meant by the Bates
court when it uses the following language:
Bankers and engineers advertise, and yet these professions are
not regarded as undignified. In fact, it has been suggested that
the failure of lawyers to advertise creates public disillusionment
with the profession. The absence of advertising may be seen to
reflect the profession's failure to reach out and serve the community . . . . Indeed, cynicism with regard to the profession
may be created by the fact that it long has publicly eschewed
advertising, while condoning the actions of the attorney who
structures his social or civic associations so as to provide contacts with potential clients.
• . . Since the belief that lawyers are somehow "above"
trade has become an anachronism, the historical foundation for
the advertising restraint has crumbled.2
This strong concern with laypersons' unmet informational
needs, coupled with the lingering notion that professionals, in the
second sense in which this term has been used, are somehow
different, gives rise to the suggestion that rejected Proposal "B"
might better answer these two concerns, though not without raising others. Although a full exploration of the concept of a regulatory code as applied to a profession goes beyond the scope of this
project, several comments are called for here. From an ideal
perspective, the concept of a profession, as distinct from any
other form of labor, should imply a degree of self-restraint, a
capacity for making considered ethical judgments, and a certain
commitment to the public good. A faith in the supposition that
those who practice law take these values seriously should go far
considered and rejected in Comment, Bar Restrictions on Dissemination of Information
About Legal Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 483, 509, 512 (1974), and in Comment,
Advertising, Solicitationand the Profession's Duty to Make Legal CounselAvailable, 81
YALE L.J. 1154, 1189-90 (1972).
234. The type of public interest meant here is the interest of the public in receiving
a free and unfettered flow of information, not the other important interest of the public
in being protected from information that is false or deceptive.
235. 97 S. Ct. at 2701-03.
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toward relieving the worries expressed by some that lawyers, if
given the opportunity to say anything about themselves, would
indulge in large-scale overreaching, misrepresentation, or other
forms of unethical behavior. It is in fact, as the Bates Court points
out, somewhat anomalous "for the opponents of advertising to
extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point,
and, at another, to assert that its members will seize the oppor' If lawyers as professionals can
tunity to mislead and distort."236
be assumed to aspire to a high ethical standard, then why should
it be necessary to as narrowly circumscribe what lawyers may be
allowed to say about themselves as Proposal "A" has done?
Would not the open structure of Proposal "B," with its emphasis
on providing ethical guidelines to help attorneys in their own
search for moral demarcations, be more appropriate? The issue
is one of how much moral discretion can be entrusted to the
professional consistent with safeguarding the layperson against
unethical behavior. On an ideal level, the professional's moral
judgment would not conflict with the public interest. In reality,
however, it would be naive to assume that the layperson would
automatically be protected if the professional were given complete discretion in what he may say about himself.
The failure of Canon 2 to live up to its title has been the
subject of extensive commentary. 3 7 The issue is raised again only
to provide a historical background which may prove helpful in
attempting to evaluate and put into perspective the current proposed redrafts of Canon 2. The central question involves a deter236. Id. at 2707.
237. For an early discussion of the Canon's shortcomings, see Kaufman, The Lawyer's
New' Code, 22 HARV. L. SCH. BULL. 19 (1970), which contains the following statements:
The layman might be pardoned for thinking that the profession's rules
against advertising and soliciting violate the Canon they purport to enforce,
since they have a tendency to restrict the availability to the public of information about lawyers. . ..

...Traditionally, the legal profession and its disciplinary committees
have concerned themselves as much or more with this kind of prohibition than
with the rules relating to dishonesty.
Id. at 20. See aLso Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of Canon 2 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 4 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 183 (1976).
Freedman, building on Kaufman's distinction between two types of rules, those which
relate to the integrity of the system of justice, and those which are more guild-like and
anti-competitive in character, says that the guild-like provisions were allowed to predominate over and pervert the more fundamental truly ethical considerations of the Canon.
For a further critical evaluation of the efficacy of the pre-Bates Code, see Morgan, The
Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L. REv.702 (1977).
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mination of which proposal better meets both the informational
and protective needs of the consumer of legal services.
The Department of Justice was unable to support either Proposal "A" or Proposal "B" although it acknowledged that Proposal "B" was preferable.2 3 Counsel for the ABA in this matter
defensible but that
advised that Proposal "A" was legally
239
defended.
easily
more
is
'B'
"Proposal
Proposal "A" appears to be easier to enforce and, in the view
of the ABA, offers a greater measure of protection to the consumer. Proposal "A" would require enforcing a list of twenty-five
exclusive categories; Proposal "B," however, would require regulating bodies to deal with less definite and less easily characterized notions of what is false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive.
Unquestionably, the consumer has the potential for receiving a
greater range of relevant information; but also, so the argument
for withholding goes, runs the greater risk of being misled by a
barrage of "slippery" quasi-truths and self-aggrandizing claims.
As the Supreme Court sees the first amendment issue in Bates,
the choice is between "the dangers of suppressing information
and the dangers arising from its free flow." 0 In this context,
perhaps the approach of Proposal "B" of leaving advertisement
238. The concept underlying Proposal "B" is clearly preferable to that of Proposal
"A"; any prohibitions on the dissemination of commercial information should be limited
to those necessary to prevent public harm, and should be no more restrictive than is
essential to accomplish that objective. Unfortunately, neither proposal is completely consistent with this concept. Letter from John H. Shenfield, Acting Asst. Att'y Gen. of the
Antitrust Div. of Dep't of Justice, to F. LaMar Forshee, Director, Center for Professional
Discipline, ABA, (Aug. 3, 1977), at 3.
239. Statement of S. Shepherd Tate, before the House of Delegates of ABA, Chicago,
Ill. (Aug. 10, 1977). Transcript at 5.
240. 97 S. Ct. at 2699, where the Court further develops the relative interests involved:
The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the free flow of
commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political
dialogue. Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such speech.
Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry information of importance to significant issues of the day. . . . And commercial speech serves to
inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services,
and this performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources as in a free
enterprise system. . . . In short, such speech serves individual and societal
interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking.
Id. It is also interesting to note the dissenting opinion of the judge in the court below. As
cited in the Supreme Court opinion, "the case should have been framed in terms of 'the
right of the public as consumers and citizens to know about the activities of the legal
profession . . . rather than as one involving merely the regulation of a profession.'" Id.
at 2696.
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content to the discretion of the individual attorney, with the limitation that it is not false, overreaching, or fraudulent, is more
consistent with the concomitant first amendment rights of speech
and hearing but less protective of the consumer.2' The ABA Task
Force and general membership, however, felt that the proposal
that, in their opinion, provided the greatest protection for the
42
public and guidance to the lawyer was preferable at this time.
It is significant to note, however, that the major
consumer groups
243
supported Proposal "B" over Proposal "A.

Greater enforceability and clarity of guidelines are the primary practical advantages of Proposal "A." The Bates Court has
entrusted to the bar association the responsibility for formulating
a means of effectively regulating lawyer advertising. The definite
and specific guidelines of the new Canon 2 may be more helpful
to the individual practitioner who is venturing for the first time
into this uncharted area than would be the less clearly delineated
consideration of Proposal "B."
A further issue in considering lawyers as professionals involves the distinctions between individual and institutional advertising. The informational needs of the consumer of legal services are twofold: first, assistance in recognition of legal problems
and, second, assistance in obtaining the lawyer most suitable for
resolving the particular legal problem. Both proposals encourage
the lawyer to participate in educational and public relations pro241. Of possible predictive value for the future of Canon 2 on the first amendment
issue is a recent Virginia case, Consumers Union of United States v. American Bar Ass'n,
427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 2993 (1977), in which
a divided three judge federal court held that the right of the consumer to be given information about attorneys (more information than would be provided by Proposal "A") was a
constitutionally protected right. It might be helpful to bear in mind that what is suggested
is not to give lawyers a greater latitude in what information they can convey to the public
than is enjoyed by others. It is, rather, to bring the professional to a position of first
amendment parity with others who advertise.
242. Statement of S. Shepherd Tate, before the House of Delegates of ABA, Chicago,
11. (Aug. 10, 1977). Transcript at 4.
243. Proposal "A" was adopted notwithstanding persuasively argued challenges to its
first amendment constitutionality by such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union
and the Consumers Union. The thrust of the Consumers Union argument is that the
disciplinary rules are vague and overbroad to the detriment of first amendment rights.
Representative of this thrust is Consumers Union's attack on the 25 categories of allowable
information. Consumers Union argues that this" 'laundry list' approach has an excellent
chance of being found to be overbroad." Sutton, Critique of ABA Task Force Proposals
"A"and "B", (filed Aug. 2, 1977) in ABA DISCIPLINARY LAw AND PROCEDURE BRIEF BANK,
#3 Microfiche 02126 at 02136. See section II notes 101-02 & accompanying text supra.
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grams on legal problems and the legal system 44 if motivated by
altruistic principles rather than by self-interest. 4 5 By specifying
the exclusive categories of information in Canon 2, the drafters
have made a choice to preclude advertisements filling both informational needs at once. 211 The probable consequence of this
choice is that individual attorneys or firms will be confined to
attracting potential clients in their direction, while the more public service oriented, problem-recognition function is likely to be
24 7
left to the profession as a whole.
The Board of Governors of the ABA addressed the issue of
institutional or educational advertising and recommended that a
special committee be created to study the feasibility of funding
and scope of a "nationwide institutional advertising program to
educate consumers to the utility, cost and availability of legal
services.214 Given the restrictions on what lawyers may say about
themselves in advertisements, and the widespread, though not
universal, inaction of the profession in meeting consumers' educational needs, it is likely that the consumers' need for information about particular lawyers will be met far sooner than will their
need for assistance in the recognition of legal problems. To be
fully deserving of professional status, the legal profession must
strive to meet both kinds of informational needs, not just the
more business oriented ones. If the various state bar associations
and the national ABA do jointly or independently institute a
vigorous consumer education program, then perhaps the perceived danger to consumers would be sufficiently lessened so that
a less restrictive stance on advertising could be adopted.
On a practical level, it is apparent that several issues have
been raised but not resolved by the interplay between the Bates
244. EC 2-2 in Appendix D.
245. It has been said, "Possibly there are lawyers who participate in public programs
on legal subjects out of an unalloyed desire to benefit the public and not themselves, but
whooping cranes are more numerous." Smith, Canon2: A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal
Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 48 TEx. L. Rav. 285,
288 (1970).
246. See Wilson, MadisonAvenue, Meet the Bar,61 A.B.A.J. 586 (1975) for examples
of mock-up advertisements that attempt to both pinpoint a legal need and suggest a
particular law firm to fill it.
247. It is not suggested that an individual law firm, given the choice, would want to
use its advertising budget to steer potential clients to another law firm, but rather that it
might wish to sponsor advertisements which would be more generally educational in
nature.
248. 46 U.S.L.W. at 1.
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decision and the new Canon 2. Among these concerns are the need
for a definition of a "routine legal service" and a consideration of
the area of lawyer specialization and certification.
Each proposal for Canon 2 would allow the attorney or firm
to indicate either a limitation of practice to certain fields of law,
or an indication of specialization in those areas in which specialization has been historically permitted, i.e., admiralty, trademark
and patent law, or an indication of certification where such is
authorized and defined by the particular jurisdiction. 49 One
practical problem in this regard is that states may find themselves pushed into formulating guidelines for specialists where
none had existed previously. For example, a problem facing the
Executive Council of the Arkansas Bar Association is that Arkansas has no agency having jurisdiction of the subject under state
law that will or has set forth designations and definitions. The
executive counsel believes that "for an attorney to use the term
'specialist' or 'certified specialist' where there is no such agency
which determines certification would be misleading and therefore
prohibited."'2' According to the council, a more difficult problem
concerns whether the attorney who does not claim to be a specialist, but who limits his practice to one or more fields of law in a
state in which no agency has jurisdiction over designations and
definitions, will be allowed to advertise his limitation of practice.
Another problem in this area is the interplay between selfproclaimed specializations and state designated certifications. If
provisions are made for formal certification programs involving a
possible combination of continuing legal education programs,
vigorous subject matter examinations, and a minimum number
of years of practice in the field, it remains to be seen whether selfproclamations would be allowed to coexist with the higher standards for formal certification. The issue here is whether certification would, in effect, become mandatory, i.e., whether only those
certified in a particular field of law would be allowed to practice
in that area.2' Even if certification did not become a prerequisite
for practicing in a particular field of law, an attitudinal change
toward general practice lawyers might result. Such lawyers or
249. EC 2-14 and DR 2-105 in Appendix D.
250. Report and Recommendations of the Specialization and Advertising Committee

of the Arkansas Bar Association, Aug. 1977 at 4.
251. According to the ABA Specialization Bulletin issued Sept. 1, 1977, this concern
was expressed by the Young Lawyers Section.
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small firms might be perceived as analogous to the general practitioner physicians and is somehow less prestigious or less qualified
than the newer specialists.
Another problem which may manifest itself on the state level
involves the interrelationship between lawyer specializations and
the determination of what constitutes a routine legal service. The
Bates decision lists four items as examples of routine legal services: uncontested divorces, uncontested adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and changes of name. The state responses fall
into four categories ranging from Louisiana's interim regulation
that stays narrowly within the limits of Batess2 to New York,
which states that "trying to permit advertising of nothing whatever beyond the particular fee information on 'routine legal services' which was held entitled to protection on behalf of Messrs.
Bates and O'Steen . . .would be a disservice to the Bar and a
waste of time in presenting to the Appellate Divisions. ' 2 '3 New
York's draft for DR 2-101 (25) may prove particularly farsighted
and durable in defining what fee information may be published
to include the following:
Fixed fees for specific legal services, fairly described in the statement, provided the legal services are clearly defined in a writing
furnished by the attorney at the time of actual engagement.
Such legal services shall include all those services which are
recognized as reasonable and necessary for the transaction involved under local custom in the area of practice in the community where the services are performed.24
An intermediate approach is taken by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in establishing temporary guidelines for lawyer advertising. New Hampshire would permit the price advertisement
25 5
of fourteen particular services that it defines as routine.
252. Letter from Louisiana State Bar Association Task Force on Lawyer Advertising,

to members of the Louisiana State Bar Association, Sept. 2, 1977. Alabama, New Jersey,
and North Carolina also follow this approach.
253. Letter from Action Unit No. 3, New York State Bar Association, to Committee
and Section Chairpersons, Sept. 7, 1977, at 1.
254. New York State Bar Association Draft of Canon 2, Aug. 30, 1977, at 9. Indiana,
Vermont, Tennessee, and Michigan follow the substantially similar approach of providing
no list of routine services but setting out guidelines for the determination of what is
routine.
255. Order by the New HampshireSupreme Court Establishing Temporary Guidelines for Advertising by Members of the New Hampshire Bar, 4 New Hampshire Law
Week 14A'(Supp. July 20, 1977).
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Another alternative approach to solving the problem of what
is routine is an FDA type identity-standards approach. If the
service offered did not contain certain elements, it could not be
called, for example, a divorce. This approach would not require
that all the elements of the service be listed in the advertisement,
which would be an unduly cumbersome requirement and would
probably have a deterrent effect on any price advertising. It
would require, instead, that all lawyers be made aware of the
technical requirement for advertising a particular service and
would subject them to sanctions for failing to deliver services that
complied with the guidelines.
In a state that adopts restrictive guidelines for determining
what constitutes a routine legal service, but allows a wide range
of specialization listings, one can imagine a situation in which
some lawyers would be allowed to advertise the prices of their
services that are deemed routine while other specialists would be
denied the privilege since their service would not be deemed routine by the state authorizing body. This could happen in a circumstance in which the particular lawyer's services are routine
for someone in his area of specialization but could not be characterized as routine for the profession as a whole. Perhaps the expertise and specialized knowledge of the various sections and divisions of the state bar associations could be utilized by the state
agencies in formulating guidelines for what is routine in each
particular area of practice.
John S. Wilkerson, III
F. David Butler
Donna Keene Holt
Sara A. Schechter Schoeman
Colorado, Mississippi, and Maryland also follow this approach in listing specific
services which are considered to be routine. Maryland takes a unique approach in listing
categories of services deemed routine coupled with the requirement that the advertisement itself specify whether certain "component parts" are included. Illustrative is Maryland's DR 2-103(A)10(d): "If constituting an offer of services in connection with nonbusiness uncontested bankruptcy, [such advertisement must] contain a statement as to
whether higher fees obtain in cases involving substantial assets, whether the fee includes
review and any necessary contest of claims of creditors, and whether the fee includes any
necessary court appearance, and as to any filing fees." Second Draft, Maryland Disciplinary Rules (unpublished, July 1, 1977).
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APPENDIX B
Table 2
NATIONAL KEY STATE LEVEL DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS AND COMPARISONS FOR 1975
I. Statistics:
A. Population of the United States:

214,304,000

B. Lawyer Population of the United States:
C. Total Dollar Amount Spent for Disciplinary Enforcement:
D. Number of Complaints Made Against Lawyers to
State Level Disciplinary Agencies:

404,772
$8,125,680
33,007

E. Number of Full-Time Employees Involved in
Disciplinary Enforcement:
1. Lawyers:

133

2. Investigators:

40

3. Clerical Personnel:

155

F. Total Instances of Public Discipline Imposed (129 Disbarments, 133 Resignations with Disciplinary Charges
Pending, 289 Suspensions and 142 Public Reprimands):

693

II, Comparisons:
A. Lawyer Population Averaged over
Complaints Made (Item I. B./
Item I. D.):

1 Complaint per 12.26 Lawyers

B. Lawyer Population Averaged over
Instances of Public Discipline
Imposed (Item I. B./Item I. F.):

1 Instance of Public Discipline
Imposed per 584 Lawyers

C. Dollar Amount Spent Averaged on
a Per Lawyer Basis (Item I. C./
Item I. B.):

$20.07 per Lawyer

D. Complaints Made Averaged over
the Instances of Public Discipline Imposed (Item I. D. Item
I. F.):

47.6 Complaints per Instance of
Public Discipline Imposed
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APPENDIX C
Table 3

1975 NATIONAL TABULATION OF THE ADOPTION AT THE STATE
LEVEL OF 14 SIGNIFICANT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
"CLARK REPORT"

Recommendation

Percentage of State Level
Disciplinary Jurisdictions
Adopting Rules Similar
To That Suggested in
Recommendation

A. Centralization of Disciplinary Enforcement:

87%

B. Rotation of Membership of Disciplinary Boards:

87%

C. Initiation of Investigation without Complaint:

92%

D. Centrally Located Records of Complaints:

81%

E. Informal Admonition of Minor Misconduct:

79%

F. Resignation with Prejudice While Under Disciplinary Investigation:

72%

G. Suspension for Incapacity:

83%

H. Reciprocal Discipline:

66%

I.

Suspension on Conviction of Serious Crime:

79%

J. Conviction Conclusive Evidence of Guilt for
Disciplinary Proceeding:

87%

K. Protection of Clients When Attorney Disciplined, Dies or Disappears:

51%

L. No Rapid Reinstatement After Disbarment:

83%

M. Required Accounting for Client Funds:

55%

N. Audit of Attorneys' Trust Accounts:

14%
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APPENDIX D

PROPOSAL "A"
CANON 2
A LAWYER SHOULD ASSIST
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
FULFILLING ITS DUTY TO MAKE
LEGAL COUNSEL AVAILABLE
EC 2-1 " * *
RECOGNITION OF LEGAL
PROBLEMS
EC 2-2 The legal profession should
assist laypersons to recognize legal
problems because such problems may
not be self-revealing and often are
not timely noticed. Therefore, lawyers
should encourage and participate in
educational and public relations programs concerning our legal system
with particular reference to legal
problems that frequently arise. Preparation of advertisements and professional articles for lay publications
and participation in seminars, lectures, and civic programs should be
motivated by a desire to educate the
public to an awareness of legal needs
and to provide information relevant to
the selection of the most appropriate
counsel rather than to obtain publicity
for particular lawyers. The problems
of advertising on television require
special consideration, due to the style,
cost, and transitory nature of such
media. If the interests of laypersons
in receiving relevant lawyer advertising are not adequately served by
print media and radio advertising, and
if adequate safeguards to protect the
public can reasonably be formulated,
television advertising may serve a
public interest.
EC 2-3 Whether a lawyer acts properly in volunteering in-person advice
to a layperson to seek legal services
depends upon the circumstances. The
giving of advice that one should take
legal action could well be in fulfillment of the duty of the legal profession to assist laypersons in recognizing legal problems. The advice is

proper only if motivated by a desire
to protect one who does not recognize
that he may have legal problems or
who is ignorant of his legal rights or
obligations. It is improper if motivated by a desire to obtain personal
benefit, secure personal publicity, or
cause legal action to be taken merely
to harass or injure another. A lawyer
should not initiate an in-person contract with a non-client, personally or
through a representative, for the purpose of being retained to represent
him for compensation.
EC 2-4 Since motivation is subjective and often difficult to judge, the
motives of a lawyer who volunteers
in-person advice likely to produce legal controversy may well be suspect
if he receives professional employment or other benefits as a result.
A lawyer who volunteers in-person
advice that one should obtain the
services of a lawyer generally should
not himself accept employment, compensation, or other benefit in connection with that matter. However, it is
not improper for a lawyer to volunteer such advice and render resulting
legal services to close friends, relatives, former clients (in regard to
matters germane to former employment), and regular clients.
EC 2-5 A lawyer who writes or
speaks for the purpose of educating
members of the public to recognize
their legal problems should carefully
refrain from giving or appearing to
give a general solution applicable to
all apparently similar individual problems, since slight changes in fact situations may require a material variance in the applicable advice; otherwise, the public may be misled and
misadvised. Talks and writings by
lawyers for laypersons should caution
them not to attempt to solve individual problems upon the basis of the
information contained therein.
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SELECTION OF A LAWYER
EC 2-6 * * *
EC 2-7 Changed conditions, however, have seriously restricted the effectiveness of the traditional selection
process. Often the reputations of lawyers are not sufficiently known to
enable laypersons to make intelligent
choices. The law has become increasingly complex and specialized. Few
lawyers are willing and competent to
deal with every kind of legal matter,
and many laypersons have difficulty
in determining the competence of
lawyers to render different types of
legal services. The selection of legal
counsel is particularly difficult for
transients, persons moving into new
areas, persons of limited education or
means, and others who have little or
no contact with lawyers. Lack of information about the availability of
lawyers, the qualifications of particular lawyers, and the expense of legal
representation leads laypersons to
avoid seeking legal advice.
EC 2-8 Selection of a lawyer by a
layperson should be made on an informed basis. Advice and recommendation of third parties - relatives,
friends, acquaintances, business associates, or other lawyers - and disclosure of relevant information about
the lawyer and his practice may be
helpful. A layperson is best served
if the recommendation is disinterested
and informed. In order that the recommendation be disinterested, a lawyer should not seek to influence another to recommend his employment.
A lawyer should not compensate
another person for recommending him,
for influencing a prospective client
to employ him, or to encourage future
recommendations. Advertisements and
public communications, whether in law
lists, telephone directories, newspapers, other forms of print media or
radio, should be formulated to convey
only information that is necessary to
make an appropriate selection. Such
information includes: (1) office information, such as, name, including
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name of law firm and names of professional associates; addresses; telephone numbers; credit card acceptability; fluency in foreign languages;
and office hours; (2) relevant biographical information; (3) description
of the practice, but only by using
designations and definitions authorized by [the agency having jurisdiction of the subject under state law],
for example, one or more fields of law
in which the lawyer or law firm practices; a statement that practice is
limited to one or more fields of law;
and/or a statement that the lawyer
or law firm specializes in a particular
field of law practice, but only by
using designations, definitions and
standards authorized by [the agency
having jurisdiction of the subject state
law]; and (4) permitted fee information. Self-laudation should be avoided.
SELECTION OF A LAWYER:
LAWYER ADVERTISING
EC 2-9 The lack of sophistication
on the part of many members of the
public concerning legal services, the
importance of the interests affected
by the choice of a lawyer and prior
experience with unrestricted lawyer
advertising, require that special care
be taken by lawyers to avoid misleading the public and to assure that the
information set forth in any advertising is relevant to the selection of
a lawyer. The lawyer must be mindful that the benefits of lawyer advertising depend upon its reliability and
accuracy. Examples of information in
law advertising that would be deceptive include misstatements of fact,
suggestions that the ingenuity or
prior record of a lawyer rather than
the justice of the claim are the principal factors likely to determine the
result, inclusion of information irrelevant to selecting a lawyer, and
representations concerning the quality
of service, which cannot be measured
or verified.
Since lawyer advertising is calculated and not spontaneous, reasonable
regulation of lawyer advertising de-
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signed to foster compliance with appropriate standards serves the public
interest without impeding the flow of
useful, meaningful, and relevant information to the public.
EC 2-10 A lawyer should ensure
that the information contained in any
advertising which the lawyer publishes, broadcasts or causes to be published or broadcasted is relevant, is
disseminated in an objective and
understandable fashion, and would
facilitate the prospective client's ability to compare the qualifications of
the lawyers available to represent
him. A lawyer should strive to communicate such information without
undue emphasis upon style and advertising strategems which serve to
hinder rather than to facilitate intelligent selection of counsel. Because
technological change is a recurrent
feature of communications forms, and
because perceptions of what is relevant in lawyer selection may change,
lawyer advertising regulations should
not be cast in rigid, unchangeable
terms. Machinery is therefore available to advertisers and consumers for
prompt consideration of proposals to
change the rules governing lawyer
advertising. The determination of any
request for such change should depend upon whether the proposal is
necessary in light of existing Code
provisions, whether the proposal accbrds with standards of accuracy, reliability and truthfulness, and whether the proposal would facilitate informed selection of lawyers by potential consumers of legal services.
Representatives of lawyers and
consumers should be heard in addition
to the applicant concerning any proposed change. Any change which is
approved should be promulgated in
the form of an amendment to the
Code so that all lawyers practicing
in the jurisdiction may avail themselves of its provisions.
EC 2-11 The name under which a
lawyer conducts his practice may be
a factor in the selection process. The

[Vol. 29

use of a trade name or an assumed
name could mislead laypersons concerning the identity, responsibility,
and status of those practicing thereunder. Accordingly, a lawyer in private practice should practice only
under a designation containing his
own name, the name of a lawyer
employing him, the name of one or
more of the lawyers practicing in a
partnership, or, if permitted by law,
the name of a professional legal corporation, which should be clearly
designated as such. For many years
some law firms have used a firm name
retaining one or more names of deceased or retired partners and such
practice is not improper if the firm
is a bona fide successor of a firm in
which the deceased or retired person
was a member, if the use of the name
is authorized by law or by contract,
and if the public is not misled thereby. However, the name of a partner
who withdraws from a firm but continues to practice law should be
omitted from the firm name in order
to avoid misleading the public.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss3/5

EC 2-12 * * *
EC 2-13 * * *

EC 2-14 In some instances a lawyer
confines his practice to a particular
field of law. In the absence of state
controls to insure the existence of
special competence, a lawyer should
not be permitted to hold himself out
as a specialist or as having official
recognition as a specialist, other than
in the fields of admiralty, trademark,
and patent law where a holding out
as a specialist historically has been
permitted. A lawyer may, however,
indicate in permitted advertising, if
it is factual, a limitation of his practice or one or more particular areas
or fields of law in which he practices
using designations and definitions
authorized for that purpose by [the
state agency having jurisdiction]. A
lawyer practicing in a jurisdiction
which certifies specialists must also
be careful not to confuse laypersons
as to his status. If a lawyer discloses
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areas of law in which he practices or
to which he limits his practice, but.is
not certified in [the jurisdiction], he,
and the designation authorized in [the
jurisdiction], should avoid any implication that he is in fact certified..
DR 2-101, Publicity.
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf
of himself, his partner, associate or
any other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm, use or participate in the
use of any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim.
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer
by potential consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to DR 2-103, the following information in print media distributed or over radio broadcasted in
the geographic area or areas in which
the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part
of the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that the information disclosed
by the lawyer in such publication or
broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A),
and is presented in a dignified manner:
(1) Name, including name of law
firm and names of professional associates; addresses and telephone
numbers;
(2) One or more fields of law in
which the lawyer or law firm practices, a statement that practice is
limited to one or more fields of law,
or a statement that the lawyer or
law firm specializes in a particular
field of law practice, to the extent
authorized under DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission
to the bar of state and federal
courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates
of graduation, degrees and other
scholastic distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
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(9) Legal teaching positions;
(10) Memberships, offices, and
committee assignments, in bar associations;
(11) Membership and offices in
legal fraternities and legal societies;
(12) Technical and professional
licenses;
(13) Memberships in scientific,
technical and professional associations and societies;
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of
bank references;
(16) With their written consent,
names of clients regularly represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer
participates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Fee for an initial consultation;
(21) Availability upon request for
a written schedule of fees and/or
an estimate of the fee to be charged
for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates subject
to DR 2-106(C), provided that the
statement discloses whether percentages are computed before or
after deduction of costs;
(23) Range of fees for services,
provided that the statement discloses that the specific fee within
the range which will be charged
will vary depending upon the particular matter to be handled for
each client and the client is entitled without obligation to an estimate of the fee within the range
likely to be charged, in print size
equivalent to the largest print used
in setting forth the fee information;
(24) Hourly rate, provided that
the statement discloses that the
total fee charged will depend upon
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the number of hours which must
be devoted to the particular matter
to be handled for each client and
the client is entitled to without
obligation an estimate of the fee
likely to be charged, in print size
at least equivalent to the largest
print used in setting forth the fee
information;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal
services,' the description of which
would not be misunderstood or be
deceptive, provided that the statement discloses that the quoted fee
will be available only to clients
whose matters fall into the services
described and that the client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate of the fee likely to be
charged in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used in
setting forth the fee information;
(C) Any person desiring to expand
the information authorized for disclosure in DR 2-101(B), or to provide
for its dissemination through other
forums may apply to [the agency having jurisdiction under state law]. Any
such application shall be served upon
[the agencies having jurisdiction under state law over the regulation of
the legal profession and consumer
matters] who shall be heard, together
with the applicant, on the issue of
whether the proposal is necessary in
light of the existing provisions of the
Code, accords with standards of accuracy, reliability and truthfulness,
and would facilitate the process of
informed selection of lawyers by potential consumers of legal services.
The relief granted in response to any
such application shall be promulgated
as an amendment to DR 2-101 (B), uni2
versally applicable to all lawyers.
1 The agency having jurisdiction
under state law may desire to issue
appropriate guidelines defining "specific legal services."
2The agency having jurisdiction
under state law should establish orderly and expeditious procedures for
ruling on such applications.

[Vol. 29

(D) If the advertisement is communicated to the public over radio, it
shall be prerecorded, approved for
broadcast by the lawyer, and a recording of the actual transmission
shall be retained by the lawyer.
(E) If a lawyer advertises a fee
for a service, the lawyer must render
that service for no more than the fee
advertised.
(F) Unless otherwise specified in
the advertisement if a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized
under DR 2-101(B) in a publication
that is published more frequently
than one time per month, the lawyer
shall be bound by any representation
made therein for a period of not less
than 30 days after such publication.
If a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized under DR 2-101(B)
in a publication that is published once
a month or less frequently, he shall
be bound by any representation made
therein until the publication of the
succeeding issue. If a lawyer publishes
any fee information authorized under
DR 2-101(B) in a publication which
has no fixed date for publication of
a succeeding issue, the lawyer shall
be bound by any representation made
therein for a reasonable period of time
after publication but in no event less
than one year.
(G) Unless otherwise specified, if a
lawyer broadcasts any fee information authorized under DR 2-101(B),
the lawyer shall be bound by any
representation made therein for a period of not less than 30 days after
such broadcast.
(H) This rule does not prohibit limited and dignified identification of a
lawyer as a lawyer as well as by
name:
(1) In political advertisements
when his professional status is germane to the political campaign or
to a political issue.
(2) In public notices when the
name and profession of a lawyer are
required or authorized by law or
are reasonably pertinent for a purpose other than the attraction of po-
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tential clients.
(3) In routine reports and announcements of a bona fide business, civic, professional, or political
organization in which he serves as
a director or officer.
(4) In and on legal documents
prepared by him.
(5) In and on legal textbooks,
treatises, and other legal publications, and in dignified advertisements thereof.
(I) A lawyer shall not compensate
or give any thing of value to representatives of the press, radio, television, or other communication medium in anticipation of or in return for
professional publicity in a news item.
DR 2-102 Professional Notices,
Letterheads and Offices.
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not
use or participate in the use of professional cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads, or similar professional notices
or devices, except that the following
may be used if they are in dignified
form:
(1) A professional card of a lawyer identifying him by name and as
a lawyer, and giving his addresses,
telephone numbers, the name of his
law firm, and any information permitted under DR 2-105. A professional card of a law firm may also
give the names of members and associates. Such cards may be used
for identification.
(2) A brief professional announcement card stating new or changed
associations or addresses, change of
firm name, or similar matters pertaining to the professional offices
of a lawyer or law firm, which may
be mailed to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and
relatives. It shall not state biographical data except to the extent
reasonably necessary to identify
the lawyer or to explain the change
in his association, but it may state
the immediate past position of the
lawyer. It may give the names and
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dates of predecessor firms in a
continuing line of succession. It
shall not state the nature of the
practice except as permitted under
DR 2-105.
(3) A sign on or near the door of
the office and in the building directory identifying the law office.
The sign shall not state the nature
of the practice, except as permitted
under DR 2-105.
(4) A letterhead of a lawyer
identifying him by name and as a
lawyer, and giving his addresses,
telephone numbers, the name of his
law firm, associates and any information permitted under DR 2-105.
A letterhead of a 1.aw firm may also
give the names of members and associates, and names and dates relating to deceased and retired members. A lawyer may be designated
"Of Counsel" on a letterhead if he
has a continuing relationship with a
lawyer or law firm, other than as
a partner or associate. A lawyer or
law firm may be designated as
"General Counsel" or by similar
professional reference on stationery
of a client if he or the firm devotes
a substantial amount of professional time in the representation of that
client. The letterhead of a law firm
may give the names and dates of
predecessor firms in a continuing
line of succession.
(B) A lawyer in private practice
shall not practice under a trade name,
a name that is misleading as to the
identity of the lawyer or lawyers
practicing under such name, or a firm
name containing names other than
those of one or more of the lawyers
in the firm, except that the name of
a professional corporation or professional association may contain "P.C."
or "P.A." or similar symbols indicating the nature of the organization, and
if otherwise lawful a firm may use as,
or continue to include in, its name the
name or names of one or more deceased or retired members of the firm
or of a predecessor firm in a con-
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tinuing line of succession. A lawyer
who assumes a judicial, legislative, or
public executive or administrative
post or office shall not permit his
name to remain in the name of a law
firm or to be used in professional
notices of the firm during any significant period in which he is not actively
and regularly practicing law as a
member of the firm, and during such
period other members of the firm
shall not use his name in the firm
name or in professional notices of the
firm.
(C) A lawyer shall not hold himself
out as having a partnership with one
or more other lawyers unless they are
in fact partners.
(D) A partnership shall not be
formed or continued between or among
lawyers licensed in different jurisdictions unless all enumerations of the
members and associates of the firm
on its letterhead and in other permissible listings make clear the jurisdictional limitations on those members
and associates of the firm not licensed
to practice in all listed jurisdictions;
however, the same firm name may
be used in each jurisdiction.
(E) A lawyer who is engaged both
in the practice of law and another
profession or business shall not so
indicate on his letterhead, office sign,
or professional card, nor shall he
identify himself as a lawyer in any
publication in connection with his
other profession or business.
(F) Nothing contained herein shall
prohibit a lawyer from using or permitting the use of, in connection with
his name, an earned degree or title
derived therefrom indicating his training in the law.
DR 2-103 Recommendation of
Professional Employment.
(A) A lawyer shall not, except as
authorized in DR 2-101(B), recommend employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or
associate to a layperson who has not
sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer.

[Vol. 29

(B) A lawyer shall not compensate
or give anything of value to a person
or organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client, or
as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in his employment by a client, except that he may
pay the usual and reasonable fees or
dues charged by any of the organizations listed in DR 2-(103)(D).
(C) A lawyer shall not request a
person or organization to recommend
or promote the use of his services or
those of his partner or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm, as a private practitioner,
except as authorized in DR 2-101, and
except that
(1) He may request referrals
from a lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a
bar association and may pay its
fees incident thereto.
(2) He may cooperate with the
legal service activities of any of the
offices or organizations enumerated
in DR 2-103(D)(1) through (4) and
may perform legal services for
those to whom he was recommended
by it to do such work if:
(a) The person to whom the
recommendation is made is a
member or beneficiary of such
office or organization; and
(b) The lawyer remains free to
exercise his independent professional judgment on behalf of his
client.
(D) A lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm may be recommended, employed or paid by, or may
cooperate with, one of the following
offices or organizations that promote
the use of his services or those of his
partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm if
there is no interference with the exercise of independent professional judgment in behalf of his client:
(1) A legal aid office or public
defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by
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a duly accredited law school.
(b) Operated or sponsored by
a bona fide nonprofit community
organization.
(c) Operated or sponsored by
a governmental agency.
(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association.
(2) A military legal assistance
office.
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by
a bar association.
(4) Any bona fide organization
that recommends, furnishes or pays
for legal services to its members
or beneficiaries provided the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized
and operated that no profit is derived by it from the rendition of
legal services by lawyers, and
that, if the organization is organized for profit, the legal services are not rendered by lawyers
employed, directed, supervised or
selected by it except in connection
with matters where such organization bears ultimate liability of
its member or beneficiary.
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his
partner, nor associate, nor any
other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm, nor any non-lawyer,
shall have initiated or promoted
such organization for the primary
purpose of providing financial or
other benefit to such lawyer,
partner, associate or affiliated
lawyer.
(c) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private
practitioner outside of the legal
services program of the organization.
(d) The member or beneficiary
to whom the legal services are
furnished, and not such organization, is recognized as the client
of the lawyer in the matter.

(e) Any member or beneficiary
who is entitled to have legal services furnished or paid for by the
organization may, if such member or beneficiary so desires, select counsel other than that furnished, selected or approved by
the organization for the particular niatter involved; and the legal
service plan of such organization
provides appropriate relief for
any member or beneficiary who
asserts a claim that representation by counsel furnished, selected
or approved would be unethical,
improper or inadequate under the
circumstances of the matter involved and the plan provides an
appropriate procedure for seeking
such relief.
(f) The lawyer does not know
or have cause to know that such
organization is in violation of
applicable laws, rules of court
and other legal requirements that
govern its legal service operations.
(g) Such organization has filed
with the appropriate disciplinary
authority at least annually a report with respect to its legal service plan, if any, showing its
terms, its schedule of benefits,
its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, and financial
results of its legal service activities or, if it has failed to do so,
the lawyer does not know or have
cause to know of such failure.
(E) A lawyer shall not accept employment when he knows or it is obvious that the person who seeks his
services does so as a result of conduct
prohibited under this Disciplinary
Rule.
DR 2-104 Suggestion of Need of
Legal Services.
(A) A lawyer who has given inperson unsolicited advice to a layperson that he should obtain counsel or
take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice,
except that:
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(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative,
former client (if the advice is germane to the former employment),
or one whom the lawyer reasonably
believes to be a client.
(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from his participation in activities designed to educate laypersons to recognize legal
problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize available legal services if such activities
are conducted or sponsored by a
qualified legal assistance organization.
(3) A lawyer who is recommended, furnished or paid by a
qualified legal assistance organization enumerated in DR 2-103(D) (1)
through (4) may represent a member or beneficiary thereof, to the
extent and under the conditions prescribed therein.
(4) Without affecting his right
to accept employment, a lawyer
may speak publicly or write for
publication on legal topics so long
as he does not emphasize his own
professional experience or reputation and does not undertake to give
individual advice.
(5) If success in asserting rights
or defenses of his client in litigation in the nature of a class action
is dependent upon the joinder of
others, a lawyer may accept, but
shall not seek, employment from
those contacted for the purpose of
obtaining their joinder.
DR 2-105 Limitation of Practice.
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself
out publicly as a specialist, as practicing in certain areas of law or as
limiting his practice permitted under
DR 2-101(B), except as follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice
before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office may use the
designation "Patents," "Patent Attorney," "Patent Lawyer," or "Registered Patent Attorney" or any
combination of those terms, on his
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letterhead and office sign.
(2) A lawyer who publicly discloses fields of law in which the
lawyer or the law firm practices or
states that his practice is limited
to one or more fields of law shall
do so by using designations and
definitions authorized and approved
by [the agency having jurisdiction
of the subject under state law].
(3) A lawyer who is certified as
a specialist in a particular field of
law or law practice by (the authority having jurisdiction under state
law over the subject of specialization by lawyers) may hold himself
out as such, but only in accordance
with the rules prescribed by that
authority.
DR 2-106 Fees for Legal Services.
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into
an agreement for, charge, or collect
an illegal or clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when,
after a review of the facts, a lawyer
of ordinary prudence would be left
with a definite and firm conviction
that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as
guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required,
the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to
the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged
in the locality for similar legal
services.
(4) The amount involved and the
results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed
by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the
professional relationship with the
client.
(7) The experience, reputation,
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and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or
contingent.
(C) A lawyer shall not enter into
an agreement for, charge, or collect a
contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
DR 2-107 Division of Fees
Among Lawyers.
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a
fee for legal services with another
lawyer who is not a partner in or
associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a
full disclosure that a division of
fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed
and responsibility assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers
does not clearly exceed reasonable
compensation for all legal services
they rendered the client.
(B) This Disciplinary Rule does not
prohibit payment to a former partner
or associate pursuant to a separation
or retirement agreement.
DR 2-108 Agreements Restricting.
the Practice of a Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall not be a party
to or participate in a partnership or
employment agreement with another
lawyer that restricts the right of a
lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by
the agreement, except as a condition
to payment of retirement benefits.
(B) In connection with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement
that restricts his right to practice law.
DR 2-109 Acceptance of
Employment.
(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if
he knows or it is obvious that such
person wishes to:
(1) Bring a legal action, conduct
a defense, or assert a position in
litigation, or otherwise have steps
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taken for him, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously
injuring any person.
(2) Present a claim or defense
in litigation that is not warranted
under existing law, unless it can be
supported by good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law.
DR 2-110 Withdrawal from
Employment.
(A) In general.
(1) If permission for withdrawal
from employment is required by
the rules of a tribunal, a lawyer
shall not withdraw from employment in a proceeding before that
tribunal without its permission.
(2) In any event, a lawyer shall
not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps
to avoid foreseeable prejudice to
the rights of his client, including
giving due notice to his client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client
all papers and property to which
the client is entitled, and complying
with applicable laws and rules.
(3) A lawyer who withdraws
from employment shall refund
promptly any part of a fee paid in
advance that has not been earned.
(B) Mandatory withdrawal.
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if
required by its rules, shall withdraw
from employment, and a lawyer representing a client in other matters
shall withdraw from employment if:
(1) He knows or it is obvious that
his client is bringing the legal action, conducting the defense, or asserting a position in the litigation,
or is otherwise having steps taken
for him, merely for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring
any person.
(2) He knows or it is obvious
that his continued employment will
result in violation of a Disciplinary
Rule.
(3) His mental or physical condi-
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tion renders it unreasonably difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively.
(4) He is discharged by his client.
(C) Permissive withdrawal.
If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable,
a lawyer may not request permission
to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and may not withdraw
in other matters, unless such request
or such withdrawal is because:
(1) His client:
(a) Insists upon presenting a
claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law and
cannot be supported by good
faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.
(b) Personally seeks to pursue
an illegal course of conduct.
(c) Insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is
illegal or that is prohibited under
the Disciplinary Rules.
(d) By other conduct renders it
unreasonably difficult for the
lawyer to carry out his employment effectively.
(e) Insists, in a matter not
pending before a tribunal, that
the lawyer engage in conduct that
is contrary to the judgment and
advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the Disciplinary
Rules.
(f) Deliberately disregards an
agreement or obligation to the
lawyer as to expenses or fees.
(2) His continued employment is
likely to result in a violation of a
Disciplinary Rule.
(3) His inability to work with cocounsel indicates that the best interests of the client likely will be
served by withdrawal.
(4) His mental or physical condition renders it difficult for him to
carry out the employment effectively.
(5) His client knowingly and
freely assents to termination of his
employment.

(6) He believes in good faith, in
a proceeding pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find
the existence of other good cause
for withdrawal.
PROPOSAL "B"
CANON 2
A LAWYER SHOULD ASSIST THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN
FULFILLING ITS DUTY TO
MAKE LEGAL COUNSEL
AVAILABLE
EC 2-1 * * *
Recognition of Legal Problems
EC 2-2 The legal profession should
assist laypersons to recognize legal
problems because such problems may
not be self-revealing and often are
not timely noticed. Therefore, lawyers
should encourage and participate in
educational and public relations programs concerning our legal system
with particular reference to legal
problems that frequently arise. Preparation of advertisements and professional articles for lay publications
and participation in seminars, lectures, and civic programs should be
motivated by a desire to benefit the
public in its awareness of legal needs
aid selection of the most appropriate
counsel rather than to obtain publicity
for particular lawyers.
EC 2-3 Whether a lawyer acts properly in volunteering advice to a layperson to seek legal services depends
upon the circumstances. The giving of
advice that one should take legal action could well be in fulfillment of the
duty of the legal profession to assist
laypersons in recognizing legal problems. The advice is proper whenever
it is motivated by a desire to protect
one who does not recognize that he
may have legal problems or who is
ignorant of his legal rights or obligations. It is improper if motivated by
a desire to cause legal action to be
taken merely to harass or injure another. A lawyer best serves the public
if he does not volunteer advice in order to obtain private gain in regard

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss3/5

74

1978]

Wilkerson et al.: Attorney Advertising: Bates' Impact on Regulation
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING

to employment. A lawyer should not
contact a nonclient, personally or
through a representative, for the purpose of being retained to represent
him for compensation.
EC 2-4 A lawyer who volunteers
advice that one should obtain the
services of a lawyer and who then
accepts employment, compensation, or
other benefit in connection with that
matter gives at least the appearance
of impropriety. However, it is not improper for a lawyer to volunteer such
advice and render resulting legal
services to close friends, relatives,
former clients (in regard to matters
germane to former employment), and
regular clients.
EC 2-5 A lawyer who writes or
speaks for the purpose of educating
members of the public to recognize
their legal problems and informing
them of his services should carefully
refrain from giving or appearing to
give a general solution applicable to
all apparently similar individual problems, since slight changes in fact situations may require a material variance in the applicable advice; otherwise, the public may be misled and
misadvised. Talks and writings by
lawyers for laypersons should caution
them not to attempt to solve individual problems upon the basis of the
information contained therein.
Selection of a Lawyer
EC 2-6 * * *

EC 2-7 Changed conditions, however, have seriously restricted the effectiveness of the traditional selection
process. Often the reputations of lawyers are not sufficiently known to
enable laypersons to make intelligent
choices. The law has become increasingly complex and specialized. Few
lawyers are willing' and competent to
deal with every kind of legal matter,
and many laypersons have difficulty
in determining the competence of lawyers to render different types of legal
services. The selection of legal counsel
is particularly difficult for transients,
persons moving into new areas, per-

sons of limited education or means,
and others who have little or no contact with lawyers. Lack of information about the availability of lawyers,
the specialized competence of particular lawyers, and the expense of initial
consultation has been said to lead
laypersons to avoid seeking legal advice.
EC 2-8 Selection of a lawyer by a
layperson should be made on an informed basis. Advice and recommendations of third parties - relatives, friends, acquaintances, business
associates, or other lawyers - and restrained publicity may be helpful. A
lawyer should not seek to influence
another to recommend his employment. A lawyer should not compensate
another person for recommending him,
for influencing a prospective client to
employ him, or to encourage future
recommendations. Advertisements and
public communications, whether in
law lists, announcement cards, newspapers, other forms or radio, should
be formulated to convey only information that is necessary to make an
appropriate selection. Self-laudation
should be avoided. Information that
may be helpful in some situations
would include: (1) office information,
such as, name, including name of
law firm and names of professional
associates; addresses; telephone numbers; credit card acceptability; languages spoken and written; and office
hours; (2) biographical information;
(3) description of the practice but
'only by using designations and definitions authorized by [the agency
having jurisdiction of the subject under state law] for example, one or
more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices; a statement
that practice is limited to one or more
fields of law; and a statement that
the lawyer or law firm specializes in
a particular field of law practice but
only by using designations, definitions
and standards authorized by [the
agency having jurisdiction under state
law]; and (4) permitted fee informa-
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EC 2-8A The proper motivation for
commercial publicity by lawyers lies
in the need to inform the public of
the availability of competent, independent legal counsel. The public
benefit derived from advertising depends upon the usefulness of the information provided to the community
or to the segment of the community
to which it is directed. Advertising
marked by excesses of content, volume, scope or frequency, or which unduly emphasizes unrepresentative biographical information, does not provide that public benefit. For example,
prominence should not be given to a
prior governmental position outside
the context of biographical information. Similarly, the use of media
whose scope or nature clearly suggests that the use is intended for selflaudation of the lawyer without concomitant benefit to the public such as
the use of billboards, electrical signs,
soundtrucks, or television commercials
distorts the legitimate purpose of informing the public and is clearly improper. Indeed, this and other improper advertising may hinder informed
selection of competent, independent
counsel, and advertising that involves
excessive cost may unnecessarily increase fees for legal services.
EC 2-8B. Advertisements and other
communications should make it apparent that the necessity and advisability
of legal action depends on variant
factors that must be evaluated individually. Because fee information frequently may be incomplete and misleading to a layperson, a lawyer
should exercise great care to assure
that fee information is complete and
accurate. Because of the individuality
of each legal problem, public statements regarding average, minimum or
estimated fees may be deceiving as
will commercial publicity conveying
information as to results previously
achieved, general or average solutions,
or expected outcomes. It would be
misleading to advertise a set fee for
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a specific type of case without adhering to the stated fee in charging
clients. Advertisements or public
claims that convey an impression that
the ingenuity of the lawyer rather
than the justice of the claim is determinative are similarly improper. Statistical data or other information
based on past performance or prediction of future success is deceptive because it ignores important variables.
Only factual assertions, and not opinions, should be made in public communications. It is improper to claim
or imply an ability to influence a
court, tribunal, or other public body
or official except by competent advocacy. Commercial publicity and public
communications addressed to undertaking any legal action should always indicate the provisions of such
undertaking and should disclose the
impossibility of assuring any particular result. Not only must commercial
publicity be truthful but its accurate
meaning must be apparent to the layperson with no legal background. Any
commercial publicity or advertising
for which payment is made should so
indicate unless it is apparent from
the context that it is paid publicity
or an advertisement.
EC 2-9 The traditional regulation
of advertising by lawyers is rooted
in the public interest. Competitive advertising through which a lawyer
seeks business by use of extravagant,
artful, self-laudatory or brash statements or appeals to fears and emotions could mislead and harm the
layperson. Furthermore, public communications that would produce unrealistic expectations in particular
cases and bring about distrust of the
law and lawyers and would be harmful to society. Thus, public confidence
in our legal system would be impaired
by such advertisements of professional services. The attorney-client relationship, being personal and unique,
should not be established as the result
of pressures or deceptions. However,
the desirability of affording the public
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access to information relevant to legal rights has resulted in some relaxation of the former restrictions
against advertising by lawyers. Those
restrictions have long been relaxed in
regard to law lists, announcement
cards and institutional advertising
and in certain other respects. Historically, those restrictions were imposed to prevent deceptive publicity
that would mislead laypersons, cause
distrust of the law and lawyers, and
undermine public confidence in the
legal system, and all lawyers should
remain vigilant to prevent such results. Only unambiguous information
relevant to a layperson's decision regarding his legal rights or his selection of counsel, provided in ways that
comport with the dignity of the profession and do not demean the administration of justice, is appropriate
in public communications.
EC 2-10 The Disciplinary Rules
recognize the value of giving assistance in the selection process through
forms of advertising that furnish
identification of a lawyer while avoiding falsity, deception, and misrepresentation. All publicity should be
evaluated with regard to its effect on
the layperson with no legal experience. The non-lawyer is best served if
advertisements contain no misleading
information or emotional appeals, and
emphasize the necessity of an individualized evaluation of the situation
before conclusions as to legal needs
and probable expenses can be made.
The attorney-client relationship should
result from a free and informed
choice by the layperson. Unwarranted
promises of benefits, overpersuasion,
or vexatious or harassing conduct are
improper.
EC 2-11 The name under which a
lawyer conducts his practice may be
a factor in the selection process. The
use of a name which could mislead
laypersons concerning the identity,
responsibility, and status of those
practicing thereunder is not proper.
For many years some law firms have
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used a firm name retaining one or
more names of deceased or retired
partners and such practice is not improper if the firm is a bona fide successor of a firm in which the deceased
or retired person was a member, if the
use of the name is authorized by law
or by contract, and if the public is not
mislead thereby. However, the name
of a partner who withdraws from a
firm but continues to practice law
should be omitted from the firm name
in order to avoid misleading the public.
EC 2-12 * * *
EC 2-13 * * *
EC 2-14 In some instances a lawyer
confines his practice to a particular
field of law. In the absence of state
controls to insure the existence of
special competence, a lawyer should
not be permitted to hold himself out
as a specialist or as having official
recognition as a specialist, other than
in the fields of admiralty, trademark,
and patent law where a holding out
as a specialist historically has been
permitted. A lawyer may, however,
indicate if it is factual, a limitation
of his practice or that he practices in
one or more particular areas or fields
of law in public announcements which
will assist laypersons in selecting
counsel and accurately describe the
limited area in which the lawyer
practices but only if he complies with
the designations and definitions authorized and approved by [the agency
having jurisdiction of the subject under state law]. A lawyer practicing
in a jurisdiction which certifies specialists must also be careful not to
confuse laypersons as to his status. If
a lawyer limits his practice, but is
not certified in the jurisdiction, he
should clearly state in any announcement of limitation of practice that he
is not certified. If the jurisdiction
does not certify specialists, the lawyer
should exercise care not to imply that
he has been certified.
EC 2-15 * * *
DR 2-101 Publicity and Advertising.
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(A) A lawyer shall not on behalf of
himself, his partner, or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm, use, or participate in the
use of, any form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent,
misleading, or deceptive statement or
claim.
(B) Without limitation a false,
fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive
statement or claim includes a statement or claim which:
(1) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact;
(2) Omits to state any material
fact necessary to make the statement, in the light of all circumstances, not misleading;
(3) Is intended or is likely to create an unjustified expectation;
(4) States or implies that a lawyer is a certified or recognized specialist other than as permitted by
DR 2-105;
(5) Is intended or is likely to
convey the impression that the lawyer is in a position to influence improperly any court, tribunal, or
other public body or official;
(6) Relates to legal fees other
than:
(a) A statement of the fee for
an initial consultation;
(b) A statement of the filed
or contingent fee charged for a
specific legal service, the description of which would not be misunderstood or be deceptive;
(c) A statement of the range
of fees for specifically described
legal services, provided there is
a reasonable disclosure of all relevant variables and considerations
so that the statement would not
be misunderstood or be deceptive;
(d) A statement of specified
hourly rates, provided the statement makes clear that the total
charge will vary according to the
number of hours devoted to the
matter;
(e) The availability of credit
arrangements; and
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(f) A statement of the fees
charged by a qualified legal assistance organization in which he
participates for specific legal
services the description of which
would not be misunderstood or
be deceptive; or
(7) Contains a representation or
implication that is likely to cause
an ordinary prudent person to misunderstand or be deceived or fails
to contain reasonable warnings or
disclaimers necessary to make a
representation or implication not
deceptive.
(C) A lawyer shall not, on behalf
of himself, his partner or associate,
or any other lawyer affiliated with
him or his firm, use or participate in
the use of any form of public cornmunication which:
(1) Is intended or is likely to
result in a legal action or a legal
position being asserted merely to
harass or maliciously injure another;
(2) Contains statistical data or
other information based on past
performance or prediction of future
success;
(3) Contains a testimonial about
or endorsement of a lawyer;
(4) Contains a statement of opinion as to the quality of the services
or contains a representation or implication regarding the quality of
legal services which is not susceptible of reasonable verification by
the public;
(5) Appeals primarily to a layperson's fear, greed, desire for revenge, or similar emotion; or
(6) Is intended or is likely to attract clients by use of showmanship,
puffery, self-laudation or hucksterism, including the use of slogans,
jingles or garish or sensational language or format.
(7) Utilizes television or until
[the agency having jurisdiction under state law] shall have determined that the use of such media
is necessary in light of the existing
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provisions of the Code, accords with
standards of accuracy, reliability
and truthfulness, and would facilitate the process of informed selection of lawyers by potential consumers of legal services.
(D) A lawyer shall not compensate
or give anything of value to a representative of the press, radio, television, or other communication medium
in anticipation of or in return for
professional publicity in a news item.
A paid advertisement must be identified as such unless it is apparent from
the context that it is a paid advertisement. If the paid advertisement is
communicated to the public by use of
radio, it shall be prerecorded, approved for broadcast by the lawyer
and a recording of the actual transmission shall be retained by the
lawyer.
DR 2-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads, Offices, and Law Lists.
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not
use or participate in the use of a
professional cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads, telephone directory listings,
law list, legal directory listings, or
a similar professional notice or device if it includes a statement or claim
that is false, fraudulent, misleading,
or deceptive within the meaning of
DR 2-101 (B) or that violates the
regulations contained in DR 2-101(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not practice under a name that is misleading as to
the identity, responsibility or status
of those practicing thereunder, or is
otherwise false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive within the meaning
of DR 2-101(B), or is contrary to law.
However, the name of a professional
corporation or professional association
may contain "P.C." or "P.A." or similar symbols indicating the nature of
the organization, and if otherwise
lawful a firm may use as, or continue
to include in, its name the name or
names of one or more deceased or retired members of the firm or of a
predecessor firm in a continuing line
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of succession. A lawyer who assumes
a judicial, legislative, or public executive or administrative post or office
shall not permit his name to remain
in the name of a law firm or to be
used in professional notices of or public communications by the firm during
any significant period in which he is
not actively and regularly practicing
law as a member of the firm, and during such period other members of the
firm shall not use his name in the
firm name or in professional notices
of or public communications by the
firm.
(C) A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with
one or more other lawyers unless they
are in fact partners.
(D) A partnership shall not be
formed or continued between or
among lawyers licensed in different
jurisdictions unless all enumerations
of the members and associates of the
firm on its letterhead and in other
permissible listings make clear the
jurisdictional limitations on those
members and associates of the firm
not licensed to practice in all listed
jurisdictions; however, the same firm
name may be used in each jurisdiction.
(E) Nothing contained herein shall
prohibit a lawyer from using or permitting the use of, in connection with
his name, an earned degree or title
derived therefrom
indicating his
training in the law.
DR 2-103 Recommendation or Solicitation of Professional Employment.
(A) A lawyer shall not seek by direct mail or other form of personal
contact and shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner,
of himself, his partner, or associate
to a non-lawyer who has not sought
his advice regarding employment of a
lawyer, or assist another person in so
doing, except that if success in asserting rights or defenses of his clients in litigation in the nature of a
class action is dependent upon the
joinder of others, a lawyer may ac-
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cept employment from those he is
permitted under applicable law to contact for the purpose of obtaining their
joinder. This Disciplinary Rule does
not prohibit a lawyer or his partner
or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm from requesting referrals from a lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or
approved by a bar association or from
cooperating with any other qualified
legal assistance organization.
Committee Note: Present DR 2-103
(B) becomes DR 2-103(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not knowingly
assist an organization that furnishes
or pays for legal services to others
to promote the use of his services or
those of his partner or associate or
any other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm, as a private practitioner,
if:
(1) The promotional activity involves use of a statement or claim
that is false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive within the meaning of DR 2-101(B) or that violates
the regulations contained in DR 2101(C); or
(2) The promotional activity involves the use of coercion, duress,
compulsion, intimidation, threats,
unwarranted promises of benefits,
overpersuasion, overreaching, or
vexatious or harassing conduct.
(C) A lawyer shall not compensate
or give anything of value to a person
or organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client, or
as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in his employment by a client, except that he may
pay for public communications permitted by DR 2-101 and the usual and
reasonable fees or dues charged by
a lawyer referral service operated,
sponsored, or approved by a bar association.
(D) A lawyer shall not accept employment when he knows or it is obvious that the person who seeks his
services does so as a result of conduct
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prohibited under this Disciplinary
Rule.
DR 2-104 Suggestion of Need of
Legal Services.
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layperson that
he should obtain counsel or take legal
action shall not accept employment
resulting from that advice if:
(1) The advice embodies or implies a statement or claim that is
false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive within the meaning of DR
2-101(B); or that violates the regulations contained in DR 2-101(C);
or
(2) The advice involves the use
by the lawyer of coercion, duress,
compulsion, intimidation, threats,
unwarranted promises of benefits,
overpersuasion, overreaching, or
vexatious or harassing conduct.
DR 2-105 Limitation of Practice.
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself
out publicly as, or imply that he is, a
recognized or certified specialist, except as follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice
before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office may use the
designation "Patents," "Patent Attorney," or "Patent Lawyer," or any
combination of those terms, on his
letterhead and office sign. A lawyer
engaged in the trademark practice
may use the designation "Trademarks," "Trademark Attorney," or
"Trademark Lawyer," or any combination of those terms, on his letterhead and office sign, and a lawyer engaged in the admiralty practice may use the designation "Admiralty," "Proctor in Admiralty,"
or "Admiralty Lawyer," or any
combination of those terms, on his
letterhead and office sign.
(2) A lawyer who is certified as
a specialist in a particular field of
law or law practice by [the authority having jurisdiction under state
law over the subject of specialization by lawyers] may hold himself
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out as such specialist but only in
accordance with the rules prescribed
by that authority.
(B) A statement, announcement, or
holding out as limiting practice to a
particular area or field of law does
not constitute a violation of DR 2-105
(A) if the statement, announcement,
or holding out complies with the designations and definitions authorized by
[the agency having jurisdiction of
the matter under state law], does not
include a statement or claim that is
false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive within the meaning of DR
2-101(B) or that violates the regulations contained in DR 2-101(C), and
if, [in a jurisdiction having a program
for certifying specialists], it clearly
reflects that the lawyer has not been
officially recognized or certified as
a specialist.
Definitions
As used in the Disciplinary Rules
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
(1) * * *
(2).
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(3) **
(4) * * *
(5)
(6) * * *
(7) "A Bar association" includes a
bar associdtion of specialists as referred to in DR 2-105(A) (1) or (2).
(8) "Qualified legal assistance organization" means a legal aid, public
defender, or military assistance office; a lawyer referral service; or a
bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for legal
services to its members or beneficiaries, provided the office, service, or
organization receives no profit from
the rendition of legal services, is not
designated to procure financial benefit or legal work for a lawyer as a
private practitioner, does not infringe
the individual member's freedom as
a client to challenge the approved
counsel or to select outside counsel at
the client's expense, is not in violation
of any applicable law, and has filed
with [the appropriate disciplinary
authority] at least annually a report
with respect to its legal service plan.
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Table 4
CURRENT TOPICS OF INTEREST IN
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
Several topics now being considered by various state level jurisdictions
within the United States deserve attention:
Non-Lawyer Representation on DisciplinaryBoards
The states of California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Washington and Wisconsin,
have added non-lawyer representation to their disciplinary boards. Reasons
given for adding non-lawyer members to disciplinary boards include the
following: this opens the disciplinary process to public scrutiny; the legal
profession does not remain totally self-regulating; and such non-lawyer
members bring new insights to disciplinary deliberations. Reasons given for
not adding non-lawyer members to disciplinary boards include the following:
non-lawyers do not understand the intricacies of the legal process; they may
be overly influenced by lawyer members of the boards; they may not maintain
the confidentiality of the proceeding; and they are not needed because review
by the highest court insures due process to the public and respondent
attorneys.
Auditing or Verification of Trust Accounts
In Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico and New Jersey,
specific procedures have been instituted which either permit the audit or
verification of lawyers' trust accounts by a board appointed by their highest
courts. Such procedures may or may not be directly linked to the disciplinary
process. The purpose of such procedures (which are in the tradition of
those used in England and Canada) is to appraise attorneys of their obligations regarding the maintenance of trust accounts and provide for the
verification of such accounts so they are maintained in a manner which complies with those professional obligations.
Fee Dispute Arbitration
Fee disputes are a major area of conflict between attorneys and their
clients. In Alaska, by an order of the Supreme Court of Alaska, and in 33
other jurisdictions on a lesser scale, fee dispute arbitration systems have been
established so that fee disputes between lawyers and clients may be arbitrated
before a panel of the local bar rather than permitting such disputes to
remain unsettled or end in litigation. In some instances, non-lawyers have
been included among the arbitrators of fee disputes. As yet, not enough
reports have been received to determine the effectiveness of fee dispute
arbitration.
(46 U.S.L.W.1, 3-12 (Aug. 23, 1977))
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